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PATOČKA AND MARX' PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY<sup>1</sup>

Patočka's reflection on Marx' conception of the philosophy of history may be perceived in relation to several philosophical issues. Although we do not see a more extensive work in his philosophical work focusing on this very topic, Marx' philosophy of history is latently present in many of Patočka's reflections. However, I believe that Patočka has a constant critical dialogue with Marx' philosophy (and especially with his philosophy of history) throughout his philosophical life. This is one of the reasons why I have tried to choose a few motives on which, in my opinion, it is possible to show Patočka's critical attitude towards Marx' philosophy of history.

## 1. HEGEL AND MARX

Marx, as is well known, turns Hegel's philosophy from head to toe in his materialistic and dialectical understanding of history. For Marx, unlike Hegel, consciousness and all the spiritual activities of people – including their history – are determined by the natural-material and economic-social conditions of their lives. This is the decisive assumption on which Marx build his philosophy of history, but it is precisely this assumption that Patočka cannot ultimately accept his conception of the philosophy of history.

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In Marx' philosophy of history, it is true that "the first premise of all human history is... the existence of living human individuals"<sup>2</sup>. Instead of an idealistic way of explaining history, it is therefore necessary to start exploring history with *real people* who are *real* people only in communion with others, individuals, their activities and the material conditions of their lives, which on the one hand had been before them and which co-determine them, and on the other hand, also by the conditions which these people *create* by their own activity.

The beginning of Marx' reflections on history is thus *man*, and man as an *active social being* who transforms nature, but also human culture – that is, nature that has already been transformed in history. For Marx, this essential human activity is in the production of the means of human life. The way of producing the means of life is then "a certain way of activity of these individuals, a certain way of externalising their life, a certain *way of their life*"<sup>3</sup>. What people as such are "coincides with their production, both with *what* they produce and with *how* they produce. So what individuals (people – add R. S.) are depends on the material conditions of their production"<sup>4</sup>. Marx thus wants to look for the place of man's birth in history in the human practice in question, in the production and reproduction of life, on a specific historical basis.

By laying the foundation in the material realm of human life, Marx fundamentally changes (as opposed to German idealism) his view of history. In the words of Marx himself: "Quite in contrast to German philosophy, which descends from heaven to earth, we ascend here from earth to heaven"<sup>5</sup>. The subject matter of Marx' critique of contemporaneous German idealistic philosophy – and especially Hegel as its supreme representative – is the very fact that in this philosophy, the living man himself is finally lost in the transcendent. On the contrary, this man must remain primary here, creating his activity forming history. Marx clearly states this: "We start from really active people and from their real life process we also interpret the development of ideological reflexes and responses of this life process"<sup>6</sup>.

Placing the history on the real, living man as a basic element of history significantly distinguishes Marx' understanding of history from Hegel's idealistic conception of history. For Marx, as K. Kosík also points out, *human reality* "is not a pre-historical or superhistorical immutable substance, but is created in

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<sup>2</sup> K. Marx, F. Engels, *Vybrané spisy v piatich zväzkoch. Zv. 1.*, trans. Š. Jenikov, M. Holubová, F. Chorvát, M. Marcelli, P. Musil, F. Novosád, D. Plachtinský, J. Šefránek, V. Triznová a iní, Bratislava: Pravda 1977, p. 220.

<sup>3</sup> K. Marx, F. Engels, *Vybrané spisy v piatich zväzkoch. Zv. 1.*, p. 220.

<sup>4</sup> K. Marx, F. Engels, *Vybrané spisy v piatich zväzkoch. Zv. 1.*, p. 220.

<sup>5</sup> K. Marx, F. Engels, *Vybrané spisy v piatich zväzkoch. Zv. 1.*, p. 224.

<sup>6</sup> K. Marx, F. Engels, *Vybrané spisy v piatich zväzkoch. Zv. 1.*, p. 224.

history"<sup>7</sup>, primarily through work and the material conditions of people's lives. Marx opposes Hegel's primarily spiritual understanding of man – and through him also the *world spirit* as self-awareness – man as a being not just spiritual, but above all carnal and born of nature.

The difference in the conceptions of the history of both German thinkers and Marx' critique of Hegel's philosophy is, of course, also noticed by Patočka, who compares Hegel's and Marx' philosophy in a lecture on Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit* in the 1949-50 school year. He compares the two concepts: "These (Hegel's – add. R. S.) mystifications consist in the fact that in Hegel the subject and the predicate are confused, namely the individual and the abstract in general. (However, the whole of Hegel's dialectical system rests on this confusion, so if it is excluded, then the system is no longer possible, the absolute truth from the solution of all the philosophical questions is gone)"<sup>8</sup>. According to Patočka, in the philosophical critique of Hegel, "Marx seeks a substantial error with Hegel, and finds it in idealism. This idealism *leads to accommodation, because it is itself just a remnant of theology* (italics R. S.)"<sup>9</sup>.

Hegel's philosophical conception of history (similarly to the concepts of his predecessors) is not radical enough for Patočka to determine the essence of human history. Marx offers another possibility by identifying the laws of history in the *economic structure of society*, from which it is necessary to explain the whole superstructure of legal and social institutions, as well as religious, philosophical and other spiritual productions of each historical period.

From his point of view, Marx also does not consider Hegel's critique of contemporary society to be sufficient, because with his one-sided spiritual foundation, Hegel finds himself in an "insightful, counter-practical position"<sup>10</sup>. Marx no longer wants to just explain the world through philosophy, but also to implement philosophy and thus *change the world*. Therefore, only such a theoretical critique that passes into a material – that is, a real, in a real, living world manifesting – world change is acceptable to him. Marx unequivocally comments on an idealistic philosophy in relation to history: "These abstractions, in themselves, *detached from real history* (italics R. S.), have no value"<sup>11</sup>. He therefore reproaches idealistic philosophers that their theories will not really help to libe-

<sup>7</sup> K. Kosík, *Dialektika konkrétního*, Praha: Academia 1966, p. 101.

<sup>8</sup> J. Patočka, *Hegelova Fenomenologie ducha*, Praha: 1965, *Archiv Jana Patočky* in Prague, Signature 3306-I., p. 9.

<sup>9</sup> J. Patočka, *Hegelova Fenomenologie ducha*, p. 9. See also J. Ružička, *Marxův pojem dějin*, in „Filosofický časopis“, 63, 2015/3, p. 415–429.

<sup>10</sup> M. Sobotka, *Hegelova fenomenologie*, in: G. W. F. Hegel, *Fenomenologie ducha*, trans. J. Patočka, Praha: Nakladatelství ČSAV 1960, p. 20.

<sup>11</sup> K. Marx, F. Engels, *Vybrané spisy v piatich zväzkoch. Zv. 1.*, p. 225.

rate man and cannot *move real history* in this way, because “true liberation cannot be enforced other than in the real world and with real means”<sup>12</sup>.

In this introduction, I wanted to show only briefly the well-known materialistic foundation of Marx’ philosophy of history – which is fundamentally different from Hegel, but also from Patočka. It is precisely on this materialistic foundation of Marx’ conception of the philosophy of history that Patočka’s critique focuses above all.

## 2. NEGATIVE PRINCIPLE AS A SOCRATIC MOTIF

From a certain point of view, it is interesting to observe which moments in Hegel, Marx, and Patočka intertwine philosophically. Above all, there is the idea of a *negative principle* in history. In the text *Eternity and History* (from the 1940s and 1950s), Patočka admits that it was Hegel from whom not just he but also Marx accepts this idea: “Hegel was the first to whom we owe the idea that the spiritual life of man and with him history is based on the negative principle, on the shortcoming that is being fulfilled”<sup>13</sup>. Based on this principle, Patočka subsequently defines the *essence of man as a historical being*: “This essence is not [...] the essence of positive, finished content, but the essential thing in it is the unfinished, unfilled, even downright negative: and yet this negative has a positive meaning, this resistance is a vital and essential positive”<sup>14</sup>. For Hegel, however, this process of *fulfilment the negative* “not just by human events, but also cosmically completed, and formed a universal whole in which all negatives and shortcomings were subsequently abolished and preserved again, eternalised in the unity of the universal idea”<sup>15</sup>.

In his philosophy of history, Marx removes from Hegel’s philosophy an *idealistic basis* to face the problem of how to connect the material, the factual side in man with his history, but “Hegel’s conviction remains that history is a process that makes sense and that the driving force of this process is in a contradiction, a lack, a negative”<sup>16</sup>. Thus, according to Patočka, Marx preserves as a historical method “dialectics, although it gives it a more restricted (simplifying – add R. S.) content – but this is also from Hegel”<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> K. Marx, F. Engels, *Vybrané spisy v piatich zväzkoch. Zv. 1.*, p. 226.

<sup>13</sup> J. Patočka, *Večnost a dějinnost*, Praha: OIKOYMENH 2007, p. 115.

<sup>14</sup> J. Patočka, *Večnost a dějinnost*, p. 113.

<sup>15</sup> J. Patočka, *Večnost a dějinnost*, p. 115.

<sup>16</sup> J. Patočka, *Večnost a dějinnost*, p. 115.

<sup>17</sup> J. Patočka, *Hegelova Fenomenologie ducha*, p. 9.

In his conception of history, Marx does not rely on any *potential* and *ideal* picture of the future, nor on anything *supra-mundane*, but above all on “real and unbearable contradictions in the (human – add. R. S.) present”<sup>18</sup>, thus from a situation that can and should be changed. In Patočka's view, this means that “the *essence of humanity is not realised* (italics R. S.) [...] that man is not yet >within himself”<sup>19</sup>. And it is here – in this *openness* or *incompleteness* – that Patočka finds a substantial *analogy* between Marxism and *Socratican understood history*, which he formulates as follows: “Both use the negative method, both are based on a deficiency to be abolished, both are historical, because the essential man, man in his essence, is not given to them, or at least not yet given”<sup>20</sup>. Patočka therefore states that from this point of view it seems impossible to talk at all about the end of history and the completion of the historical process. Man is understood here as a *historical* and at the same time a social being who must *implement* his essence in history. The relationship between man and history understood in this way also implies the very *concept of history*, which thus presupposes infinity, variability or awkwardness in Patočka. In this sense, closedness may be understood as the *end of history*. Patočka therefore states that from this point of view “it seems impossible to talk at all about the end of history and the completion of the historical process”<sup>21</sup>. This is one of the main ideas that Patočka incorporates into his own philosophical conception of history, and which he did not abandon for the rest of his life. For Marx, this moment of *openness* of history is, in my opinion, also possible to find, if we understand open history as a certain *horizon of human activity*.

One of the key terms for such an understanding of history in Marx' conception of the philosophy of history is the term of *alienation*, which Marx takes over, by reworking it, from Hegel. This is a moment which, of course, does not escape Patočka's attention. For Marx, the alienation of man arises as a result of the ever-growing *division of work*, which gradually leads to the disintegration of the original unity of people within their society and also of the original unity between man and nature. From this moment on – in Hegel's original *dialectic of lord and slave* – relations of inequality between people and the rule of one man over another emerge, which one feels as alienation in relation to the world.

The problem of alienation in Marx' philosophy of history is also highlighted by Heidegger, for whom Marx “penetrates into the essential dimension of history

<sup>18</sup> J.Patočka, *Večnost a dějinnost*, p. 115.

<sup>19</sup> J. Patočka, *Večnost a dějinnost*, p. 115.

<sup>20</sup> J. Patočka, *Večnost a dějinnost*, pp. 115–116.

<sup>21</sup> J. Patočka, *Večnost a dějinnost*, p. 116. Patočka obviously alludes to Hegel's idea of the *end of history*. See M. Sobotka, *K Hegelově filosofii dějin*, in G. W. F. Hegel, *Filosofie dějin*, trans. M. Váňa, Pelhřimov: Nová tiskárna Pelhřimov 2004, pp. 287; 294.

in the experience of alienation”<sup>22</sup>. Marx is primarily concerned with *alienation of man's work* as the basis for all other forms of alienation, including its spiritual forms, which allows him to explain the lack of understanding of human reality as a consequence of the unresolved *contradictions* of real social life.

However, the problem of alienation as Marx understands it has an impact on the openness or, conversely, closedness of human history, in the sense of *widening* and *narrowing* the horizon of human activity in history – human *practice*. It is precisely in the notion of practice that “socio-human reality is discovered here as the opposite of the given, i.e. as formation and at the same time as a specific form of human *being*. *Practice is the sphere of human being*”<sup>23</sup>. And it is in practice where “man's *openness* to reality is created at all”<sup>24</sup>, it also means in relation history. What is important, however, is the definition of this problem as the *horizon of history*, understood as “the relationship between the given and the created, is (however) specific and thus *provides a starting point* (italics R. S.)”<sup>25</sup>. For Marx, practice can form the *basis* for the active, practical activity of man as his relationship to history: “Man learns not just of alienation, but also of the possibilities of overcoming it”<sup>26</sup>. And more importantly for the historical understanding of the relationship between man and history, in this process he recognizes that “the measure of power and helplessness, freedom and non-freedom, adoption and alienation, knowing and not-knowing, possibilities and facts, etc. *is not constant*, but variable”<sup>27</sup>. It is here that it is possible to find a moment of openness of history, the creation of which depends solely on man.

However, man lives in society, in a certain *social structure*, which is part of a certain historical situation, and therefore Marx seeks a way out just “where this particular measure is formed, i.e. (tries to – add. R. S.) to analyse and change the social structure in which people live”<sup>28</sup>. Marx' communism as a solution, a change in a given social structure, it is not, in its original idea, the *objective* of humanity, but merely *a means* to the liberation and self-finding of man.

However, over time, these original Marx' ideas were *distorted* and distant from his *original* philosophy, which means that the Marx project implemented in history and his original intention *differ*. In relation to Marx's philosophy, Patočka

<sup>22</sup> M. Heidegger, *O humanismu*, trans. P. Kůrka, Praha: Ježek 2000, p. 30.

<sup>23</sup> K. Kosík, *Dialektika konkrétního*, p. 154.

<sup>24</sup> K. Kosík, *Dialektika konkrétního*, p. 156.

<sup>25</sup> L. Nový, *Marxova filosofie dějin v otevřených dějinách*, in E. Urbánek (ed.), *Marx a dnešek*, Praha: Svoboda 1968, p. 129. See also S. Sayers, *Marx and Teleology*, in „Science and Society“, 82, 2019/1, p. 37–63.

<sup>26</sup> L. Nový, *Marxova filosofie dějin v otevřených dějinách*, p. 129.

<sup>27</sup> L. Nový, *Marxova filosofie dějin v otevřených dějinách*, p. 129.

<sup>28</sup> L. Nový, *Marxova filosofie dějin v otevřených dějinách*, p. 129.

himself is aware of this fact when he speaks of “the transformation of the critical theory of society into the Bible of worldview”<sup>29</sup>. It is primarily a question of what is perhaps closest to Marx’ philosophy of history – the *place of man as an individual in society* and thus also in history. According to Patočka, modern variations of Marxism transformed Marx’ original ideas so much that “as far as their relationship between the individual and society is concerned, their understanding is very far from Marx’ understanding”<sup>30</sup>.

In this relationship between man-individual and history, in my opinion, Marx is closer to Patočka's conception of philosophy than Hegel. The role of the individual in the history of which he is also the creator is far from negligible in Marx and Patočka. This moment distinguishes them both from Hegel’s philosophy of history, where the individual is not important at all, where one must realise that “one can be all only on condition that one is nothing”<sup>31</sup>. However, in relation to the *material – ideal* opposition, Hegel is closer to Patočka, as they both recognise the *spiritual impulse* as primary in history. Regarding Marx’ critique of Hegel’s idealism, Patočka writes: “Marx seeks to *simplify* Hegel, like Aristotle simplified Plato, to rid the system of the unrealistic, *transcendental*, ideal component. It is to become an amputation of logic: this metaphysics is a mere abstraction of the process of nature and history”<sup>32</sup>. However, Patočka cannot completely identify with the idea of Marxism, which ultimately making man *absolute* and according to which “man is everyone here, because only nature and nothing higher stand against him”<sup>33</sup>. He refuses to acknowledge Marx’ basic thesis – that man and all human history stand on a material basis.

By rejecting the absolutisation of man, but also of the world spirit in Hegel, Patočka’s conception of the philosophy of history is also different from Hegel’s and Marx’ – he himself refuses to making absolute anything in his conception of the philosophy of history.

### 3. CRITIQUE OF DIALECTICS

Patočka recognizes (in the period of writing the work *Negative Platonism*) a way of interpreting the human experience of the world, which, according to him, culminates in the 19th century, when it manifests itself as a *cult of man*,

<sup>29</sup> J. Patočka, *Doba poevropská a její duchovní problémy*, in J. Patočka, *Péče o duši II*. Prague: OIKOYMENH 1999, p. 38.

<sup>30</sup> J. Patočka, *Doba poevropská a její duchovní problémy*, p. 38.

<sup>31</sup> J. Patočka, *Hegelova Fenomenologie ducha*, p. 60.

<sup>32</sup> J. Patočka, *Dialektika*, Praha: 1987, *Archiv Jana Patočky* in Prague, p. 15.

<sup>33</sup> J. Patočka, *Dialektika*, p. 14.



based on the idea that “man or humankind is able to save him-/itself”<sup>34</sup>. It is, therefore, the originally Christian idea of salvation as the implementation of the divine idea. In this new form, however, God is no longer needed because “man can save himself – Christian theology is true, but like anthropology”<sup>35</sup>. According to Patočka, the cult of man is precisely the result of the combination of two great traditions in thought: on the one hand, Christian *theology* and, on the other hand, the *mechanism* of modern science. Their connection thus creates a newly understood world, already fully *controlled* by man. This is possible because “this mechanism is subject to the teleology of theological vision, provided that this teleology is fully implemented in this world of ours, in the world governed by this mechanism”<sup>36</sup>. The mechanism of modern science is thus a guarantee of the effectiveness and feasibility of the originally Christian, *extra-mundane salvation*, but it requires resignation to the metaphysical dimension of human experience.

Patočka then considers Hegel’s and Marx’ *dialectics* to be an intermediate step in this development of thought. According to him, Hegel brings a *new and last glitter* to metaphysics, which at the same time showed above all “its hitherto hidden humanism, its anthropocentrism, the tendency to place man [...] in the middle and on top of the universe”<sup>37</sup>.

Subsequently, there is also room for Patočka's *critique of dialectics*, which differs from his conception of negative Platonism in the understanding of the negative principle. Despite the necessary emphasis and the use of the negative principle as a dynamic moment, dialectics is essentially *static* for Patočka. This is because, despite the *transcendence* used here, despite the fact that “it happens through non-existing, negation, is a transcendence from existing to existing, from fullness to fullness, and (here is the difference from Patočka's conception – add R.S.) each non-existent has only a transitory and apparent meaning”<sup>38</sup>, however, in the end it again points only to the (empirically verifiable, given) existing one. Thus, if we accept dialectics as a decisive way of interpreting history, “it will never finally appear negative to us in its originality”<sup>39</sup>. However, negation (negative principle) is not possible “other than by entering the unreal, non-existent

<sup>34</sup> J. Patočka, „Kult člověka“ a jeho převrat v dnešní době, in J. Patočka, *Péče o duši III.*, Prague: OIKOYMENH 2002, p. 706.

<sup>35</sup> J. Patočka, „Kult člověka“ a jeho převrat v dnešní době, p. 706.

<sup>36</sup> J. Patočka, „Kult člověka“ a jeho převrat v dnešní době, p. 708.

<sup>37</sup> J. Patočka, *Negativní platonismus*, in J. Patočka, *Péče o duši I.* Praha: OIKOYMENH 1996, p. 314.

<sup>38</sup> J. Patočka, *Nicota, absolutní pozice a zápor*, in J. Patočka, *Péče o duši III.*, Praha: OIKOYMENH 2002, p. 659.

<sup>39</sup> J. Patočka, *Nicota, absolutní pozice a zápor*, p. 659.



into the real”<sup>40</sup>. Patočka's inspiration for Heidegger's idea of ontological difference and his understanding of the concept of being, which distinguishes from the being, is evident here.

At this moment – the assumption and understanding of the whole, which must finally be implemented in the world (as it exists in one form or another) – there is, according to Patočka, also a fundamentally different moment between Kant and Hegel<sup>41</sup>. It is that moment in Hegel's philosophy – the moment of the necessary feasibility of philosophy in the objective world – that Marx subsequently follows.

Regarding the influence of Hegel's philosophy on Marx, which he considers to be a lawful influence, Patočka writes in that period: “Hegel's philosophy of history had to either be translated into an objective-sociological concept, as Marx did, or allow the *definite of a non-objective* (non-realistic, non-existing – add. R.S.) element and thus find oneself in a realm that does not give man absolute power of truth, absolute disposition of oneself and the universe”<sup>42</sup>. Marx thus attempted to transfer Hegel's philosophy from heaven to earth, precisely on the basis of dialectics, or “to extend speculative dialectics by practice, to amputate (it – add. R. S.) by theology”<sup>43</sup>. Thus, philosophy in its conception must in principle be based on the real, material world of people. Marx wants to understand *science as philosophy*, as opposed to Hegel, who “believes in philosophy as science”<sup>44</sup>. Therefore, for Patočka, Marx is “more Western, more positivist, but otherwise he maintains his (Hegel's – add. R. S.) concretism”<sup>45</sup>.

For both German philosophers, it is precisely dialectics that – in Patočka's view – *seemingly* restores meaningfulness to the interpretation of human history. In reality, however, it “admits only one of its kind: abstract, methodological, ideological, materialised meaningfulness. This is why dialectics is a *complement to nihilism*, not its actual refutation”<sup>46</sup>. As a result of each step of dialectics, there is always a thesis that is something existing – it always goes from the existing to another existing, that is, to something that can be objectified and subsequently controlled. This is clearly not enough for Patočka, and according to him, dialectics shares a common assumption with *positivism* – that is *Methodism and*

<sup>40</sup> J. Patočka, *Nicota, absolutní pozice a zápor*, p. 659.

<sup>41</sup> See J. Patočka, *Nicota, absolutní pozice a zápor*, pp. 659–660.

<sup>42</sup> J. Patočka, *Pravda, negativita, svoboda*, in J. Patočka, *Péče o duši III.*, Praha: OIKOYMENH 2002, p. 678.

<sup>43</sup> J. Patočka, *Humanismus, pozitivismus, nihilismus a jejich překonání*, in J. Patočka, *Péče o duši III.*, Praha: OIKOYMENH 2002, p. 721.

<sup>44</sup> J. Patočka, *Pravda, negativita, svoboda*, p. 678.

<sup>45</sup> J. Patočka, *Pravda, negativita, svoboda*, p. 678.

<sup>46</sup> J. Patočka, *Humanismus, pozitivismus, nihilismus a jejich překonání*, pp. 721–722.

*Objectivism*: “Positivism deadens nature, the dialectic of history, not so much by trying to *control* both as by seeing *all meaning in controlling*”<sup>47</sup>.

In this context and elsewhere, Patočka recognises *two kinds of transcendence*, namely *horizontal* and *vertical* transcendence. He himself characterizes them: “horizontal, through a given social state, which must be replaced by another, and vertical, in relation to immediacy in general, which subsequently negotiates space and place for the first, horizontal transcendence”<sup>48</sup>. As long as horizontal transcendence changes or wants to change the state of the material world, that is, it ultimately changes one existing form into another one, the vertical one transcends each existing one – towards being. There is obviously a motive of Patočka’s *third movement of existence*, which is tied to the spiritual dimension, and therefore a materialistic understanding and interpretation of history cannot suffice to him.

According to Patočka, Marx has, from this point of view, a “purely horizontal transcendence leading from only one state of social production to another [...] materialistic understanding [...] pretends that the meaning-giving moment would be given in content by instinctive, immediate life and its forces”<sup>49</sup>. Furthermore, in relation to Marx’ philosophy of history, he states unequivocally: “Marx only knows horizontal transcendence”<sup>50</sup>. Although horizontal transcendence changes the social establishment – that is, the state of affairs, of the existing – according to Patočka, it does not bring any deeper meaning to a realistic philosophical understanding of history.

#### 4. UNDERSTANDING THE WORK (AS LOAD)

In connection with the issue of work, which is understood by Patočka primarily as load, we then get to the important issue of duality between *everyday life* – *non-everyday life* (Patočka also uses the term of *exceptionality* in this context). He says of this duality that human life always moves in its dimensions. Originally, it is a duality of *everyday life* – *a holiday*, in modern times transformed into the opposite of *a working day* – *rest*. Non-everyday life belongs to human life, it cannot simply be got rid of. In the pre-historical period, according to Patočka, it was represented by the *sacred* or *orgiastic* dimension. That has changed with the rise of history.

In the pre-historical period, as Patočka recognises it in his conception of the philosophy of history, according to him, work was perceived as something *non-*

<sup>47</sup> J. Patočka, *Humanismus, pozitivismus, nihilismus a jejich překonání*, p. 722.

<sup>48</sup> J. Patočka, *O smysl dneška*, in J. Patočka, *Češi I.*, Praha: OIKOYMENH 2006, p. 244.

<sup>49</sup> J. Patočka, *O smysl dneška*, p. 244.

<sup>50</sup> J. Patočka, *O smysl dneška*, p. 245.

-sacred, as load and the *need* to ensure human livelihood. However, it is similar today, although the vast majority of hard work has been removed (this is a positive moment in *science-technology*). In understanding work as load, necessity, something that our efforts for biological survival force us to do, Patočka differs significantly from Marx' understanding of work, which is also reminded by I. Blecha, when he writes that "everything subject to the load of work with Patočka, is still out of history. Work is not merely a non-historical factor, but one directed against history – man and his historicity cannot therefore be explained from work"<sup>51</sup>.

In the current *post-European age*, which is one of its symptoms, according to Patočka, life in everyday life is "life in technical rationality, it is a life *in the very means*. Working for the work's sake – this is a modern dream"<sup>52</sup>. Here we can see a very important moment that has a great impact on the present – *the original means* are gradually replacing the *objectives*, or the very meaning of human life. In Patočka's view, the work itself – originally as a means of preserving life and thus as a load that one must *bear, endure* – itself becomes the objective or meaning of man's life and history, which is the key motif of Marx' conception of the philosophy of history. Patočka cannot agree with such an interpretation of history.

A related issue is that work alone cannot *satisfy* the vast majority of people who work. They therefore work to receive a wage for which they then buy again only means of survival (food, clothing, housing, etc.) or, as an alternative to *non-everyday life* (originally a sacred dimension of life), means of *escape from everyday life* (alcohol, drugs, sex, etc.). Often, which is inherently absurd, original means (especially property of a material nature) become an *objective* for man to be assisted by other people as *means*. Or we get carried away by everyday work, in which we can also find an escape, we can "get lost in what we procure"<sup>53</sup>. The opposite of everyday life and non-everyday life is, as Patočka says, a "fundamental factor of humanity"<sup>54</sup> from which it is not possible to break out.

However, the problem is even deeper. Patočka puts this contradiction in connection with another, even more fundamental contradiction in relation to history, and thus it is the antithesis of *prosperity and decline*. On the side of decline, it is precisely every day, everyday life, ordinary life at the biological level – i. e. a *self-consuming* life with its needs, which it constantly creates for us.

<sup>51</sup> I. Blecha, *Jan Patočka*, Olomouc: Votobia 1997, p. 167.

<sup>52</sup> J. Patočka, *Poznámky posluchačů z přednášky Vznik a konec Evropy*. in J. Patočka, *Péče o duši III.*, Praha: OIKOYMENH 2002, p. 428.

<sup>53</sup> J. Patočka, *Kacířské eseje o filozofii dějin*, in J. Patočka, *Péče o duši III.*, Praha: OIKOYMENH 2002, p. 101.

<sup>54</sup> J. Patočka, *Poznámky posluchačů z přednášky Vznik a konec Evropy*, p. 428.

Here is a fundamental assumption that Patočka accepts (from Heidegger – from the period of the work *Being and Time*)<sup>55</sup> – that the *declining tendency* of human life is not something *secondary*, something that only complements growth, progress, but on the contrary, it is something *original and major*, something that needs to be broken and transcended. The way out of the load of everyday life, which is often represented by work, is then possible for man on the one hand in an *orgiastic way* in *self-forgetfulness*, in an escape from the load, which was applied by a pre-historical man and which seems to be increasingly applied by contemporary man. On the other hand, there is the starting point of historical man. This second way out – as overcoming everyday life, or as a kind of vertical transcendence, that is, the rise from decay – characterises Patočka, as is well known, with the concept of *care for the soul*. It is for him “a great performance in which something like spiritual life arises, great poetry, active life; history as active life in the polis; dramatic poetry [...] philosophy [...] these are all different aspects of the movement by which Western man rises from decline and creates history”<sup>56</sup>. It is precisely this uplifting, this rise from decline that, according to him, is what is disappearing nowadays, after post-European times, and therefore it may seem that, from the point of view of its conception, we have *returned* to pre-history.

Patočka comments clearly on the very characteristics of work from his point of view (in response to the critique of his philosophical conception of history from the point of view of materialistic conception, which he formulated in his own glosses on *Heretical Essays*): “Work has always been understood as a difficult fate, which of course also has its good side, but in essence it is human *slavery!*”<sup>57</sup>. Here he also distinguishes here from the perspective of his conception of the three movements of existence – accepting this division from Hannah Arendt – *work* as the preservation of life, i.e. as the first movement of existence from production, understood as defence and attack on the natural environment, i.e. in principle *the second movement* of existence which he calls the movement of defence. In a similar way, Patočka also expresses himself in a similar way in one of the discussions on the lectures related to the *Heretical Essays*: “The important thing in Marx’s doctrine, after all, is ... that production is understood in terms of work. And work is still a livelihood. It is what is able to sustain life. And from this point of view of maintaining and escalating life, the whole process is understood as economic and the whole *vita*

<sup>55</sup> See M. Heidegger, *Bytí a čas*. trans. I. Chvatík, P. Kouba, M. Petříček jr., J. Němec, Praha: OIKOYMENH 2008, pp. 156–160.

<sup>56</sup> J. Patočka, *Poznámky posluchačů z přednášky Vznik a konec Evropy*, p. 429.

<sup>57</sup> J. Patočka, *Vlastní glosy ke „Kacířským esejům“*, in J. Patočka, *Péče o duši III.*, Praha: OIKOYMENH 2002, p. 139.

active”<sup>58</sup>. In Marx' conception of the philosophy of history, Patočka lacks a spiritual element, which in his own conception he describes by *the third movement* of existence. This is his vertical transcendence, which transcends the first two movements.

Elsewhere, in one of his older considerations, Patočka expresses himself in a similar vein: “Work is probably not an invention of a slave (here he encounters Hegel's dialectic of lord and slave – add. R. S.), but slave labour was in almost every period a degenerative form, which indeed was necessary historically, but it always had a different form next to it”<sup>59</sup>. The above-mentioned other form is precisely the spiritual element as a certain opposite of the material understanding of the world and human history.

In relation to Marx, Patočka then writes that “*seeing work as production* is only possible at a certain time period [...] only in the modern capitalist system, which is itself the fruit of historical development with its long stage of *separation* between work and production”<sup>60</sup>. In his conception of history, Patočka tries to show, in his own words, that here (since a time – since the beginning of history and politics in Greece) there is no conditionality of politics by the economy, but that “something new is happening here; from the time the policy is invented”<sup>61</sup>. And then he clarifies this wording: “at the moment when politics is emerging, the economy acquires a new, *service meaning* (italics R.S.), not in such a way that politics, the domain of the discovery of freedom and the ground of truth [...] is just a reflection of economic conditions. It is precisely that «higher sphere» that is reflected in the lower one, its state, its rise and decline is reflected in the economy”<sup>62</sup>.

Similarly, Marx' idea of a class struggle is subject to criticism by Patočka, because this struggle “takes place in the *political sphere* and is, in principle, a struggle in *the sphere of freedom for a broader approach to freedom*. Therefore, the class struggle alone cannot again be a proof for an economic understanding of history”<sup>63</sup>. Patočka understands the class struggle as a political matter and, in a sense, a spiritual one – that is why, according to him, “one cannot be isolated from another spirituality that breaks out in the sphere of freedom. There is not just struggle but also solidarity, there is not merely a commonwealth, but

<sup>58</sup> J. Patočka, *Shrnutí a diskuse*, in J. Patočka, *Péče o duši III.*, Praha: OIKOYMENH 2002, p. 334.

<sup>59</sup> J. Patočka, *Civilizace a vykoupení II.*, in J. Patočka, *Péče o duši III.*, Praha: OIKOYMENH 2002, p. 705.

<sup>60</sup> J. Patočka, *Vlastní glosy ke „Kacířským esejům“*, p. 139.

<sup>61</sup> J. Patočka, *Vlastní glosy ke „Kacířským esejům“*, p. 139.

<sup>62</sup> J. Patočka, *Vlastní glosy ke „Kacířským esejům“*, p. 140.

<sup>63</sup> J. Patočka, *Vlastní glosy ke „Kacířským esejům“*, p. 140.

also the community and the community knows other bonds than a common enemy”<sup>64</sup>. It is insufficient for Patočka to explain and philosophically understand history only on the basis of the class struggle as the driving principle of history and he cannot accept it. It is in the community that “politics is emerging, which is only where the concept of *giving meaning to life from and for freedom* arises”<sup>65</sup>. It is also necessary to see here a positive spiritual, moral moment, which arises – for the first time in Greece – with the emergence of the polis as a community of equal and free people. For Patočka, it is necessarily connected with the principle of care for the soul, as well as philosophical problematisation and the ability to endure in this problematisation.

This moral moment associated with *responsibility*, which he evidently lacks in the materialist conception of history, is also pointed out in his reflections on Marx’s philosophy of history: “The ingenious idea of Karl Marx [...] for the first time highlighted the importance of class differentiation [...] class struggle in the whole edge that determines the whole course of history. Unfortunately, he neglected the human, moral dimension and brought his theory as close as possible to biological naturalism”<sup>66</sup>. In Marx philosophy of history, in the view of Patočka, therefore, “instead of a moral appeal to responsibility, the *automatism of history* takes place (italics R. S.)”<sup>67</sup>.

According to Patočka, this is a one-sided materialistic view of history “from the point of view of the monotonous theme of exploitation”<sup>68</sup>, and a philosophical interpretation of history on the basis of this principle alone is unacceptable to him.

The fundamental principle on the basis of which Patočka wants to distinguish his conception of philosophy of history from Marx’ – despite some moments which he considers positive and inspiring for his philosophy – is obviously a materialistic understanding of the essence of human history, with which he cannot ultimately identify. He bases his concept on the key spiritual and moral principle on Socrates-Plato care for the soul, which is primary and irreplaceable for his philosophical understanding of human history and for his philosophical interpretation of human history.

<sup>64</sup> J. Patočka, *Vlastní glosy ke „Kacířským esejům“*, p. 140.

<sup>65</sup> J. Patočka, *Vlastní glosy ke „Kacířským esejům“*, p. 139.

<sup>66</sup> J. Patočka, *Evropa a její dědictví*, in J. Patočka, *Péče o duši III.*, Praha: OIKOYMENH 2002, p. 254.

<sup>67</sup> J. Patočka, *Civilizace a vykoupení II.*, p. 703.

<sup>68</sup> J. Patočka, *Evropa a její dědictví*, p. 254.

## PATOČKA A FILOZOFIA HISTORII MARKSA

## Abstrakt

Refleksja Patočki nad filozofią historii Marksa może być postrzegana w odniesieniu do kilku zagadnień filozoficznych. Choć w jego twórczości filozoficznej nie znajdujemy obszerniejszej pracy koncentrującej się na tym właśnie temacie, Marksistowska filozofia historii jest obecna w tle wielu rozważań Patočki. Istnieje kilka zagadnień filozoficznych, w których można wykazać krytyczny stosunek Patočki do filozofii historii Marksa. Jest to przede wszystkim kwestia rozumienia zasady negatywnej, dialektyki, pracy i walki klas. Najważniejszą zasadą, na podstawie której Patočka chce odróżnić swoją koncepcję filozofii historii od Marksistowskiej, pomimo pewnych aspektów, które uważa za pozytywne i inspirujące dla swojej filozofii, jest materialistyczne rozumienie istoty ludzkiej historii przez Marksa, z którym nie może się ostatecznie utożsamić. Patočka opiera swoją koncepcję na zasadzie sokratejsko-platońskiej troski o duszę, która jest pierwotna i niezastąpiona dla jego filozoficznego rozumienia ludzkiej historii i dla jego filozoficznej interpretacji tejże historii.

Słowa kluczowe: Karol Marx, Work, Jan Patočka, filozofia historii, dialektyka.

## PATOČKA AND MARX' PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

## Abstract

Patočka's reflection on Marx' philosophy of history may be perceived in relation to several philosophical issues. Although we do not find a more extensive work in his philosophical work, focusing on this very topic, Marx' philosophy of history is latently present in many of Patočka's reflections. There are several philosophical issues on which it is possible to show Patočka's critical attitude to Marx' philosophy of history. It is above all a matter of understanding the negative principle, dialectics, work, and class struggle. The most important principle on the basis of which Patočka wants to distinguish his conception of philosophy of history from Marx', despite some moments that he considers positive and inspiring for his philosophy, is Marx's materialistic understanding of the essence of human history, with which he cannot ultimately identify. Patočka bases his concept on the principle of Socrates-Platonic care for the soul, which is primary and irreplaceable for his philosophical understanding of human history and for his philosophical interpretation of human history.

Keywords: Karl Marx, Work, Jan Patočka, Philosophy of History, Dialectics.



## PATOČKA UND DIE MARXSCHES GESCHICHTSPHILOSOPHIE

## Abstrakt

Patočkas Überlegungen zur Marx'schen Geschichtsphilosophie können im Zusammenhang mit mehreren philosophischen Fragen gesehen werden. Obwohl wir in seinem philosophischen Werk keine umfangreichere Arbeit zu diesem Thema finden, ist die Marx'sche Geschichtsphilosophie in vielen Überlegungen Patočkas latent präsent. Es gibt mehrere philosophische Themen, an denen sich Patočkas kritische Haltung zur Marx'schen Geschichtsphilosophie zeigen lässt. Dabei geht es vor allem um das Verständnis des negativen Prinzips, der Dialektik, der Arbeit und des Klassenkampfes. Das wichtigste Prinzip, anhand dessen Patočka seine Konzeption der Geschichtsphilosophie von der Marx'schen abgrenzen will, ist – trotz einiger Momente, die er als positiv und inspirierend für seine Philosophie betrachtet – das materialistische Verständnis von Marx' Wesen der menschlichen Geschichte, mit dem er sich letztlich nicht identifizieren kann. Patočka stützt sein Konzept auf das Prinzip der Seelenpflege von Sokrates und Plato, das für sein philosophisches Verständnis der menschlichen Geschichte und für seine philosophische Interpretation der menschlichen Geschichte primär und unersetzlich ist.

Stichwörter: Karl Marx, Arbeit, Jan Patočka, Geschichtesphilosophie, Dialektik.

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