The article’s subject is the status of the homosexual minority in the world of sports, which–as one would assume–is a hetero-normative world. The author draws attention to the different situations of lesbians and gays in sports as a result both of the manner in which sports themselves are seen and of how femininity andmasculinity in sports are viewed (certain types of sports activity are perceived as being masculine, and certain as being feminine). The attitudes of the male and female athletes themselves are described, as well as the attitude towards them in the sports environment and their perception in public opinion. The Gay Games, competitions for sexual minorities, are also presented, with their relation to mainstream (heterosexual) sports. Particular attention is paid to the ambiguous status of sexual minorities and various practices used within these milieus and towards them.
Semi-structured individual in-depth interviews were conducted to explore and compare which social norms with regard to the debt-incurring process are important to Poles with various experiences of indebtedness. Thematic analysis within a constructionist framework identified the social norms important in the borrowing process for Poles and revealed, as expected, a number of differences between people with various indebtedness experiences. Model borrowers have a significantly different approach to debt than unreliable debtors and non-borrowers. Model borrowers seem to be oblivious to the negative sides of loans as well as indicate fewer reasons for justifying not repaying obligations than others. For unreliable debtors, loans are a quick way to solve financial problems. They borrow money out of necessity rather than to finance any larger, long-term investments and have their own private rules for borrowing. Non-borrowers, although aware of borrowers’ higher standard of living, emphasize that debt is associated with permanent stress and psychological burden. Model borrowers, unlike the others, declare that in their immediate vicinity are only those who use and pay their loans in a timely manner.
Ethicists have thus far not paid much attention to uncertainty, very often concentrating on highly idealized hypothetical situations where both empirical (e.g. the state of the world, the spectrum of possible decisions and their consequences, the causal connections between events) and normative (the content of norms, value scales) matters were clearly defined and well-known to the decision-maker. In this article, which stems from a project on different types of decisions under uncertainty related to the rapid progress in biomedical research, I analyze some situations of normative uncertainty, cases when an agent must make a decision, but does not know which choice is correct, for example, because he/she has contrary intuitions about the permissibility of available decisions. The view termed comparativism claims that in such cases the appropriate decision depends not only on the credences that one assigns to different norms, but also on how much possible decisions are worth taking in the light of these norms. I analyze a few cases of normative uncertainty, and a specific counter-argument against the current versions of comparativism, showing that under normative uncertainty this view imposes risk neutrality, although it permits us to have different risk attitudes under empirical uncertainty. I also argue that a precautionary approach to situations of normative uncertainty is overly simplistic.
A danger of falling into the trap of the naturalistic fallacy seems to unambiguously exclude bodiliness from the search for moral norms . But is it really true that there is no role for the body to play when the intellect occupies itself with formulating moral norms? Undoubtedly the body constitutes – in a sense – the basis of morality, since human freedom can exist only as freedom incarnate. It would be equally difficult to deny that the body constitutes boundaries for morality. Bodiliness may significantly restrain cognitive abilities of men; but it may also reduce their capabilities to fulfill their moral obligations. A major controversy arises over the issue whether the body can influence the content of moral norms. Even if one accepts the validity of the thesis of an intransgressible boundary between the world of facts and the world of values, there is no doubt that man never experiences his body in the same way as he does other material objects. An experience of one’s own body matters significantly in ethical reflection.
The article presents the problem of micro-apartments. The issue is presented in a cross-sectional view, covering both the historical overview and current trends. The problem has been discussed against the background of demographic factors that justify the trend of minimizing living space. In addition to spatial issues, the paper presents the social and psychological issues related to small-scale inhabitation, as well as legal frames concerning minimal size of the flats.
The main goal of this article is to characterise and compare some aspects of Hilary Putnam’s referential theory of meaning and Robert B. Brandom’s inferential theory of meaning. I will do it to indicate some similarities and differences in these theories. It will provide an opportunity for a deeper understanding of these theories and for a more adequate evaluation of how they describe and explain the process of meaning acquisition of linguistic expressions.
In his theory of meaning Putnam emphasises the importance of reference understood as a relationship which connects linguistic expressions and extra-linguistic (empirical) reality. Brandom acknowledges inference as a main category useful in characterising the meaning of expressions used in premises and a conclusion of inference. But his theory of meaning is criticised for minimalising the role of an empirical component (demonstratives etc.). He tries to defend his standpoint in the anaphoric theory of reference.
Putnam like Brandom claimed that we – as cognitive subjects – are not in a situation in which we learn about the extra-linguistic reality in a direct way. It is the reality itself as well as our cognitive apparatus that play a role in a cognitive process.
In modern conditions of urban development, there is a need to improve the technology for determining the investment attractiveness of urban lands by developing a method and models for assessing its impact, which will be based on the construction of a two-level system of indicators, which will determine the integral investment criterion and develop guidelines for improving the investment attractiveness of urban lands. As a result of the research, the value of the integral indicator of urban land investment attractiveness was determined, which allowed to apply it in the system of normative monetary valuation of urban land and to develop methodological recommendations for improving the efficiency of its investment attractiveness assessment. A method for assessing the investment attractiveness of urban land, as the main element of technology, based on the determination of indicators for assessing the integral criterion for the development of guidelines for improving the urban land investment attractiveness is developed. By the value of the integral criterion, the integral indicators of the potential investment attractiveness of urban lands are determined, considering the changes in the normative monetary value of the lands of settlements and the level of investment attractiveness of the regional centers of Ukraine is determined.
The normative system of Bogusław Wolniewicz (1927–2017) can be subsumed under three categories: (1) pessimism (fatalism, or ‘tychism’ in Wolniewicz’s terms), (2) moral determinism (‘non-meliorism’), (3) conservatism (‘right-hand orientation’). Ad (1) Wolniewicz was pessimistic in two ways: he believed human life to be tragic (fatalism) and was also convinced that most people are guided by bad instincts (dualism). Ad (2) Wolniewicz believed that moral character was biologically determined and immutable. But his strong position on this subject ignores the classical view of Aristotle or the Stoics for whom moral character (or conscience) was acquired by habit and shaped deliberately. Ad (3) I suggest that a good historical example of conservative tendency was Critias of Athens. His famous fragment of the Sisyphus contains the idea of a supremacy of laws over human passions, and reduces religion to a supportive role with respect to ethics and politics. Wolniewicz’s dualism of right-hand and left-hand orientation encourages me to distinguish between a right-wing and a left-wing perception of value. For a leftist, value is intensity of a chosen feature (progressive value), whereas for a rightist, value is an area of freedom between inacceptable extremities (modular value). On these premises I propose a simple model of axiological conflict between left-wing and right-wing citizens.