This article is in a sense a dialogue devoted to the presence of conspiracy theories on social media and mass culture. The authors present the current state of research on the development of digital culture and its social consequences. Next, a case study of the existence of the conspiracy theory of so-called Wielka Lechia is presented. In the analysis the authors combine theoretical and technical considerations of Web 2.0 with research inquiry, which is the analysis of the structure of the Great Lechia theory in social media. The problem of the popularity of the concept of Paweł Szydłowski's and Janusz Bieszk's has been referred to a wider context related to the modern functioning of historical knowledge on the Web. The factual orientation of historical education and the influence of social media on the functioning of the social dimension of history and historians have been indicated as the reason for the current state of the problem. Finally, the authors refer to the digital version of pseudoscience to its earlier analog counterparts and make a structural comparison of both. The effect of this confrontation is to point the phenomenon of remediation of conspiracy theories and the growing deprofessionalization of discourse, which ultimately leads to the end of the era of intellectual authorities.
This article critically evaluates the summary procedure introduced by Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights, adopted within the reform of the European Court of Human Rights system. The summary procedure, now set out in Art. 28(1)b of the Convention, was instituted in order to facilitate expediency and to reduce the case load of the Court. This article argues that while judicial economy is a legitimate goal, the summary procedure under Art. 28(1)b has considerable deficiencies that undermine some of the systemic goals and core values of ECHR law. There is a manifest lack of remedies vis-à-vis the choice of the procedure, choice of applicable law, and no appeals against final decisions rendered in the course of the summary procedure. Notably, the concept of “well-established case-law” seems to be neither clear nor reliable, as evidenced in the cases analysed in the article. These cases, which involve the issue of socially- owned property in Serbia, serve to demonstrate some of the significant errors in interpretation and decision-making which can result from application of the summary procedure.
The purpose of this article is to determine the relationship between the principles of subsidiarity and effectiveness and an effective remedy for the excessive length of proceedings within the legal order of the European Convention on Human Rights. The article assumes that these key principles of the ECHR’s legal order have an impact on such a remedy, both in the normative and practical dimensions. This assumption has helped explain many aspects of the Strasbourg case law regarding this remedy. Concerning the relationship of this remedy with the principle of subsidiarity, it raises issues such as: the “reinforcing” of Art. 6 § 1; the “close affinity” of Arts. 13 and 35 § 1; and the arguability test. In turn, through the prism of the principle of effectiveness, the reasonableness criterion and the requirement of diligence in the proceedings are presented, followed by the obligations of States to prevent lengthiness of proceedings and the obligations concerning adequate and sufficient redress for such an excessive length of proceedings. The analysis shows that an effective remedy with respect to the excessive length of proceedings is not a definitive normative item, as the Court consistently adds new elements to its complex structure, taking into account complaints regarding the law and practice of States Parties in the prevention of and compensation for proceedings of an excessive length.