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Ideological Inconsistencies on the Left and Right as a Product of Coherence of Preferences for Values. The Case of Poland

Abstract: The terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ cannot describe two extremes of a single ideological dimension. Instead, a bi-dimensional model including socio-cultural and socio-economic facets of leftism/rightism is postulated. Several studies conducted in the USA and Western Europe show a relative coherence of left-wing and right-wing orientation regarding both dimensions, whereas very diverse patterns can be found in the countries of Eastern Europe. In Poland cultural and economic leftism-rightism seem to be clearly negatively related. The general hypothesis in this paper claims that such ideological inconsistency is a product of coherence at the level of preferences for values, i.e. covariance within individualistic (Openness to change and Self-enhancement) as well as within collectivist values (Conservation and Self-transcendence). Based on a survey study ($N = 750$) conducted on a representative sample of Poles, it was shown that preferences for values made up two distinct dimensions: Openness to change vs Conservation, and Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence. They are positively related but have fundamentally different relationships with political self-identification and ideology.

Key words: Left-Right, preferences for values, political ideology, political polarization

Bi-dimensionality of the left and right orientation

The division of politics into left and right orientations is one of the most widely used in the social sciences. Historically, it derives from late eighteenth century France. In the French parliament of the nineteenth century it generally corresponded to the supporters of the republic (left) and monarchy (conservatives, right). Modeled on the French reality, leftism and rightism were traditionally associated with orientation on two fundamentally separate systems of values. The Left came to the fore of the social change directed at providing citizens economic security as well as assuring them equality of economic, political, and social rights. The core of the right-wing views was commitment to traditional values (religion, nation, family) and conservatism meant as a will to maintain the *status quo* (e.g. Rokeach, 1973; Kitschelt, 1994; Skarżyńska & Henne, 2011).

According to many researchers, using the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ cannot describe two extremes of a single, coherent ideological dimension (Middendorp, 1978;

Feldman, 1988; Knight, 1999; Ashton, Danso, Maio, Esses, Bond & Keung, 2005; Choma, Ashton & Hafer, 2010). The main weakness of this concept seems to be one-dimensionality – an underlying assumption that a variety of philosophical beliefs, social values, and economic issues are so closely connected that they can be ordered on a linear continuum of political views. Instead, it may be argued that the bi-dimensional model with the dimension concerning culture and social identity, and the second one concerning socio-economic issues fits contemporary politics better. Based on such a model, someone whom we recognize as a supporter of the Left would show a distinct preference for redistribution of income and extended welfare policy as well as openness to change in culture and morals. In opposition, a follower of the right-wing orientation would show economic liberalism and a conservative attitude to cultural and moral changes. More and more studies show that these are separate, though positively correlated sets of ideological beliefs (e.g. Feldman, 1988; Boski, 1991; Ashton et al., 2005; Choma et al., 2010).

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Bi-dimensionality of the Left and Right in Europe

Most of the studies conducted in the USA and Western Europe show a relative coherence of left-wing and right-wing orientation regarding both – cultural and economic – facets (cf. Knight, 1999). Subsequent analyses for Western Europe performed on data from the European Values Study (EVS, 2008) confirmed the same pattern (Wójcik & Cislak, 2012; Aspelund, Lindeman, & Verkasalo, 2013). It was found that people with left-wing self-identification declared cultural liberalism and support for state interventionism. On the other hand, declared right-wingers revealed cultural conservatism and support for the free-market economy. However, the above pattern was not confirmed in Eastern Europe. Several ideological patterns observed in Eastern Europe had a very diverse form. One may argue that divisions into the Left and Right in Eastern European countries do not have so stable ideological fundamentals as in Western Europe.

The case of Poland

The Polish EVS results became a part of a whole series of findings showing Poles as one of the most peculiar European societies in terms of political self-identifications and political orientations. There are empirical findings, admittedly sparse but consistent with each other, which show that in political self-identification, as well as in political ideology, the views representative for cultural rightism correlate negatively with the views representative for economic rightism (cf. Golec, 2001; Radkiewicz, 2013). Some authors also point to the negative correlation between RWA (*Right-Wing Authoritarianism*) and SDO (*Social Dominance Orientation*), two ideological orientations strongly related to an individual's conservatism in the sphere of social identity and views on social inequalities, respectively (cf. Duriez, Van Hiel & Kossowska, 2005). All in all, the above-mentioned results suggest that for the majority of Poles there are two predominant forms of political beliefs: 1) cultural leftism harmoniously coexisting with economic rightism and 2) cultural rightism harmoniously coexisting with economic leftism.

This picture should be supplemented by some characteristics of the political scene in Poland. Polish politics has been dominated for over a decade by two fiercely rival parties: Civic Platform (CP) and Law and Justice (L'n'J). The deepening conflict between CP and L'n'J and their leaders led to a strong polarization of political preferences in the voting electorate (at the expense of eroding support for several other firmly rooted political parties). In the last three parliamentary elections CP and L'n'J won from 2/3 to 3/4 of all the votes. Moreover, candidates of CP and L'n'J have dominated the last three Presidential Elections. Each time the final decision has been made in the second round of the election, and the candidates of CP or L'n'J won with a difference of a few percent of the vote. However, such a strong political conflict and polarization of the party electorates does not correspond to the ideological divisions between the Left and Right. For example, the research on L'n'J followers

show them as an especially culturally right-wing and simultaneously economically left-wing electorate (cf. Skarżyńska & Henne, 2011).

Reasons for ideological inconsistency

In general, most of the current explanations concerning ideological inconsistency in the Polish electorate present that phenomenon as a kind of eccentricity that is considerably differing from the prototypical model. It is frequently seen as a difficulty that hinders the understanding of political preferences and comparisons to other countries. Researchers usually search for the causes of Polish ideological inconsistency in various socio-historical and cultural determinants (cf. Wójcik & Cislak, 2012; Skarżyńska & Henne, 2011; Słomczyński & Shabad, 2000). Past explanations almost exclusively emphasized the importance of political and societal factors that could structuralize political attitudes and orientations in this specific form. In this approach, such factors like a clash of the past and present political system or socio-economic structure of the society decided which ideological contents form consistent and harmonious whole in the human mind. However, a macro level approach does not point out any psychological mechanism capable of structuralizing cultural and economic aspects of left-wing and right-wing ideology in a way that makes them coherent psychological structures. In this paper an idea for such a mechanism will be proposed. The intent is to provide empirical evidence that the ideological inconsistency in political views can be regarded as a product of psychological coherence at the level of preferences for values.

Preferences for values as the foundations of the Left and Right

An efficient point of departure to look for such axiological coherence is Duckitt's work (2001, 2002, 2010). He claims that on the basis of available literature a general conclusion can be formulated that socio-cultural attitudes, values, orientations etc. make up two superior dimensions. The extremes of the first dimension are comprised of features like conservatism, traditionalism, and collectivism on the one hand, and freedom, openness, and individualism on the other. The extremes of the second dimension are comprised of economic conservatism, social domination, and beliefs in inequalities on the one hand, and social well-being, egalitarianism, and humanitarianism on the other (e.g. Schwartz, 1994; Saucier, 2000). If the presence of both psychological orientations seems to be indisputable, it is still an open question whether they have any basic dispositional causes that are situated in the sphere of human personality.


Duckitt argued that a world view is not only a reflection of an individual's social reality, but also a reflection of some stable individual dispositions. He pointed out two personality dispositions: autonomy vs social conformity and tough – vs tender-mindedness. In his Dual Process Motivational model, both personality characteristics develop an individual's motivational goals

(ideological orientations) mainly by means of specific schemas of the social world, but also directly. Strong dispositional conformity is responsible for sensitivity to the perceived dangers of a social order and enhances the distinctiveness of goals related to social control and safety. Strong dispositional tough-mindedness enhances the distinctiveness of goals related to power, dominance, social prestige, etc. In Duckitt's theory these characteristics underlie, respectively, right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation – two ideological variables recognized by him as fundamental causes of a variety of negative social attitudes (e.g. in-group favoritism, prejudice, discrimination).

The Current Study

Due to its generality, Duckitt's idea of the two ideological orientations underlain by corresponding personality characteristics can be utilized as a useful theoretical framework to explain Left-Right ideological inconsistency as described in Poland. It is quite easy to notice that in reference to political ideology both general orientations are represented by cultural and economic leftism-rightism, respectively. Further, it will be argued that negative correlation between cultural and economic Left-Right may be interpreted as a reflection of the psychological consistency of certain motivational goals. It means that even if cultural and economic rightism correlate negatively (as in Poland), the motivational goals expressed by these two aspects of ideology have to be coherent.

Figure 1. Hypothetical links between preferences for values and political ideology



Permanent preferences of certain values over others can be seen as a characteristic of someone's personality (cf. Schmitt, Schwartz, Steyer and Schmitt, 1993). In the most influential current theory of personal values, Schwartz (e.g. 2006, 2012) identified ten types of values that could be ordered on two higher-order dimensions: Openness to change vs Conservation and Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence. Researchers looking for some general psychological characteristics underlying ideological orientations point out – explicitly or implicitly – that the motivational goals built into cultural Left-Right express opposite psychological needs and motives that are spread between Openness to change and Conservation, whereas

the motivational goals built into economic Left-Right express opposite needs and motives that are spread between Self-transcendence and Self-enhancement (e.g. Braithwaite, 1997; Cochrane, Billig & Hogg, 1979; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Feldman, 2003; Schwartz, 1994). From that perspective, Openness to change (Personal autonomy) vs Conservation induces a fundamental difference between the Left and Right as to how the role of state in relations between an individual and national community is viewed. The state's priority should be, respectively, protecting individual autonomy and human rights or ensuring order, security, and strengthening the national community (cultural dimension). On the other hand, Self-transcendence vs Self-enhancement reflects a fundamental difference between the Left and Right as to how the role of state in the economy is viewed. The state's priority should be, respectively, the promotion of social equality by redistribution of resources or the promotion of economic growth and productivity, which implies tolerance of social inequalities (economic dimension).

It may be assumed that both general dimensions of preferences for values structuralize not only the content of ideological orientations but also their relationships. Figure 1 shows a hypothetical model of the relations between preferences for values and ideology that should appear in Poland. The model depicts three closely connected hypotheses. First one, based on the previous research conducted in Poland, claims that:

(1) cultural and economic Left-Right will be negatively related.

Secondly, cultural and economic Left-Right should both have fundamentally different relationships with preferences for values. It is hypothesized that:

(2a) Openness to change vs Conservation will be a positive predictor of cultural Left-Right;

(2b) Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence will be a negative predictor of economic Left-Right.

Thirdly, if the relationship between cultural and economic Left-Right is negative (hypothesis 1) and hypotheses 2a and 2b are valid, it is hypothesized that:

(3) Openness to change vs Conservation and Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence should be positively related.

Hence, the model in Figure 1 relies on the reasoning that in the countries of Western Europe as well as in East European countries (including Poland) directions of the relationships between preferences for values and political ideology (hypotheses 2a and 2b) are stable or, in other words, 'culture-free'. However, we know that the relationship between cultural and economic Left-Right is changeable or 'culture-dependent'. This leads to the hypothesis 3 which is crucial in the proposed model, since it directly utilizes the idea of coherent motivational goals. In Poland, the expected negative correlation between cultural and economic Left-Right (hypothesis 1) means that Conservation tends to be consistent with Self-transcendence (expressed by cultural rightism and economic leftism, respectively), while Openness to change tends to be consistent with Self-enhancement (expressed by cultural

leftism and economic rightism, respectively). Therefore, Poland is a country where Openness to change vs Conservation and Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence have to be positively related.

Hypothesis 3 seems to describe a general feature of the collective mentality of Poles. It claims that the Polish society is probably dominated by two most numerous groups of people. The first group manifests relatively strong covariance of *individualistic characteristics* (Openness to change and Self-enhancement), while a relatively strong covariance of *collectivist characteristics* (Conservation and Self-transcendence) is characteristic of the second one. In consequence, it suggests a justified prediction concerning political polarization in Poland. If such characteristics indeed determine structuring political ideology and political preferences, it is justified to expect that:

- (4) The above described groups of people – individualists and ‘communitarians’ – make up the social basis for the extremely polarized electorates of the two largest parties – Civic Platform and Law’n’Justice, respectively.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Since the research hypotheses concerned phenomena observable at the macro scale level and characteristics of the Polish society, it was a natural decision to conduct the study on a representative sample of Poles. Therefore, a survey study of 750 respondents was conducted. Respondents were selected to the random-quota sample based on a two-stage procedure: 1) random sampling of urban and rural areas, and then 2) random selection of respondents based on quotas (sub-groups defined by the combinations of three criteria: sex, age, and education). Surveys were conducted in respondents’ homes by trained interviewers using a computerized questionnaire format (Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing).

The sample consisted of 52.7% females and 47.3% males. It included 20.4% of respondents in the 18 to 30 age bracket, 27.9% was aged 31–44, 25.3% was aged 45–60, and 26.4% was above the age of 60. Primary and lower education was held by 9.5% of respondents, vocational – 35.7%, secondary and post-secondary – 34.2%, and 20.6% of the respondents had higher education. The sample’s distribution in terms of place of residence was as follows: 41.3% of respondents lived in the countryside, 6.3% in small towns up to 20 thousand inhabitants, 23.1% in towns above 20 to 100 thousand, 17.3% in towns above 100 to 500 thousand, and 12% in cities above 500 thousand inhabitants.

Measures

Preferences for values

In order to measure Openness to change vs Conservation and Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence a suitable method had to be developed. In Schwartz’s model a variety of personal values express the diversity of motives by which an individual may be guided. The higher-order

dimensions show how that diversity can be structuralized, but they are recognized rather as general labels describing groups of values than as independent constructs expressing axiological preference for conservation values over openness to change values and preference for self-enhancement values over self-transcendence values. Since in the current approach both dimensions were thought to reflect actual preferences – subjectively differentiated and directly measured – a specific method of measurement was developed.

Based on Schwartz (2006, 2012) studies, a list of twenty-four characteristics was completed. They were as follows: *Openness to change* – autonomy, independence of thinking, curiosity about the world, inventiveness, open-mindedness, passion to discover the world; *Self-enhancement* – ambition, resourcefulness, effectiveness, managerial skills, successfulness, leadership; *Conservation* – obedience, modesty, humility, respect for authorities, self-discipline, orderliness; and *Self-transcendence* – helpfulness, loyalty to others, compassion for others, care for others, fairness, solidarity with others.

Every respondent received the following instruction: *In a moment you will be presented a set of different characteristics that everybody may possess. Generally, all of these characteristics are regarded as POSITIVE. In each set there are 6 rows including 4 characteristics. Now, please think about YOURSELF and then arrange the characteristics in each row from the one that you consider the most important to the one you consider the least important TO YOU.* Next, six rows including four characteristics were shown to the respondent (sequentially). Each row contained one characteristic indicative of openness to change, self-enhancement, conservation, and self-transcendence (see an example below).

I.	Ambition	Modesty	Helpfulness	Autonomy
II.	Self-discipline	Independence of thinking	Successfulness	Compassion for others
III.	Care for others	Leadership	Respect for authorities	Open-mindedness
IV.	Loyalty to others	Humility	Inventiveness	Effectiveness
V.	Resourcefulness	Solidarity with others	Obedience	Curiosity about the world
VI.	Fairness	Passion to discover the world	Orderliness	Managerial skills

The presentation of characteristics included two forms of randomization. First, twenty-four randomly sampled templates were prepared and each of them included six rows with four characteristics. All twenty-four templates were invariable as for the content and order of row appearance (an exemplary set is depicted above). The second form of randomization appeared within each

row. Four characteristics fixed in a row always appeared in a random order.

A characteristic being chosen first within the row (the most important) was coded by a rank of 1 and the one chosen as the last (the least important) was coded by a rank of 4. Characteristics chosen as the second and third received ranks of 2 and 3, respectively. For further analyses and indices construction the original ranking order was reversed so that the characteristics were coded from 1 as the least important to 4 as the most important.

The applied procedure was *ipsative*, i.e. each rank within the row was contingent upon the other ranks in that row. This method was applied since it was particularly important to directly assess a preference for one bunch of values 'over' the other. For this reason, a measurement of individual's preferences relativized within the structure of four categories of characteristics was necessary, rather than measure preferences in absolute terms. It allows to avoid response biases especially feasible when all of the assessed characteristics are positive and socially desirable. If respondent is not demanded to make precise differentiations, he/she is very likely to recognize all such characteristics as important and preferable.

Cultural and Economic Left-Right

Both dimensions of the Left-Right can be measured in two ways: as a form of ideology (set of coherent beliefs) or as respondent's self-identification. What's more, previous research showed (e.g. Jost, Glaser, Sulloway & Kruglansky, 2003; Radkiewicz, 2013) that the motivational goals of cultural Left-Right are adequately measured by two highly correlated variables, namely cultural conservatism and right-wing authoritarianism, whereas the motivational goals of economic Left-Right are adequately measured by a pair of other highly correlated variables: economic conservatism and social dominance orientation. Therefore, to take the above complexity into consideration, a multi-measure approach was applied.

Cultural and economic conservatism. This scale consists of 22 items forming two subscales: cultural conservatism and economic conservatism. It has been adapted to the Polish context by Golec (2001) based on De Witte's (1990) instrument. The subscale of cultural conservatism (12 items) measures approval/disapproval of the traditional national-Catholic worldview, while the subscale of economic conservatism (10 items) measures approval/disapproval of the economic order based on an unhindered free-market. Examples: cultural conservatism – 'In Poland, Christian values should be particularly protected', 'Poland should be mainly for the Poles', 'Public life in Poland should be in accordance with the recommendations of the Church's social doctrine'; economic conservatism – 'Taxes for the richest people are too high at present', 'The government has a duty to help people who cannot get along' (reversed), 'Large income differences are indispensable if our country is supposed to grow rich' (responses coded from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree). Both subscales formed reliable indices ($\alpha = .88$ and $.78$, respectively).

Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and Social dominance orientation (SDO). To measure RWA 20 items were randomly selected from Altemeyer's (1996) original 30-item RWA scale. Examples: 'What our country really needs instead of more civil rights is a good stiff dose of law and order', 'Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children should learn', 'Being virtuous and law-abiding is in the long run better for us than permanently challenging the foundation of our society'. The shortened scale of Sidanius and Pratto (1999) was used to measure SDO. Examples: 'Some groups of people are simply not the equals of others', 'Some people are just more worthy than others', 'We should try to treat one another as equals as much as possible'. Responses for RWA were coded on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), and for SDO were coded from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Both scales were sufficiently reliable: $\alpha = .72$ and $.75$, respectively.

Political self-identification. Respondents were asked to assess their political views in two ways: 1) in reference to moral issues (from 1 – strongly liberal to 9 – strongly conservative), and 2) in reference to economic issues (from 1 – strongly social to 9 – strongly free-market).

Political preferences

A measure of political preferences was necessary for the analyses aimed to test the effect of preferences for values on political polarization of the Polish voters. Each respondent was asked which party he/she would vote for if a parliamentary election was held on the upcoming Sunday. All of the respondents had the following response options: 1) to choose who they want to vote for from a list of 11 political parties; 2) if the favorite party was not on the list, respondents could answer 'Other party'; 3) 'I would give an invalid vote'; and 4) 'I would not go to vote'.

Results

Higher-order dimensions of preferences for values: empirical separation and indices construction

Testing of the model had to be preceded by an empirical separation of the two hypothesized dimensions of preferences for values. The first step was to compute separate indices of Openness to change, Self-enhancement, Conservation, and Self-transcendence. After recoding initial ranks, each index was calculated as a mean rank of importance ascribed to its six characteristics within the row in which the characteristics were placed. Descriptive statistics for the indices as well as their inter-correlations are depicted in Table 1.

At the sample level, the highest mean rank was held by the characteristics of Self-transcendence ($M = 2.70$; $Sd = .57$) and Self-enhancement ($M = 2.62$; $Sd = .54$), while the lowest mean rank was ascribed to Conservation ($M = 2.34$; $Sd = .58$) and Openness to change ($M = 2.33$; $Sd = .59$). As it was expected, inter-correlations showed that the opposite extremes of both hypothetical dimensions turned out to be negatively and strongly correlated: $r = -.61$ ($p \leq .01$) for Openness to change with Conservation,

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlation Matrix for Preferences for Values

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Openness to change (1)				
Self-enhancement (2)	.22**			
Conservation (3)	-.61**	-.60**		
Self-transcendence (4)	-.56**	-.64**	.19**	
M	2.33	2.62	2.34	2.70
SD	.59	.54	.58	.57

** $p \leq .01$

and $r = -.64$ ($p \leq .01$) for Self-enhancement with Self-transcendence $r = -.64$ ($p \leq .01$). Two other highly negative oppositions were also observed: between Self-enhancement and Conservation and between Openness to change and Self-transcendence ($r = -.60$ and $-.56$; $p \leq .01$). Individualistic characteristics (Openness to change and Self-enhancement) as well as collectivist characteristics (Conservation and Self-transcendence) turned out to be positively related ($r = .22$ and $.19$, respectively; $p \leq .01$).

The above analyses proved that distinguishing two superior dimensions of the personal values – Openness to change vs Conservation and Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence – is fully justified. In consequence, after recoding the ranks on the items indicative of Openness to change and Self-enhancement, two higher-order indices were computed as a mean rank of twelve corresponding characteristics. The internal reliability of the indices of


Openness to change vs Conservation ($M = 2.36$; $Sd = .50$) and Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence ($M = 2.68$; $Sd = .53$) amounted to Cronbach's alpha .71 and .73, respectively.

Figure 2 depicts results of the confirmatory factor analyses conducted for the two newly computed dimensions using IBM SPSS Amos 21.0. Due to some peculiarities typical of ipsative measurement the analyses were performed separately¹. In both cases a one-dimensional model with ten corresponding characteristics was tested. In terms of fit statistics both models had a satisfactory goodness of fit: for Openness to change vs Conservation it was GFI = .939, SRMR = .073 and RMSEA = .078 ($df = 51$); and for Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence it was GFI = .940, SRMR = .064 and RMSEA = .072 ($df = 54$).

Preliminary analysis of the Left-Right bi-dimensionality

Table 2 depicts inter-correlations among the variables indicative of cultural and economic Left-Right orientation. As it was argued in the *Method* section, cultural Left-Right would be based on low vs high Cultural Conservatism, low vs high Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and self-identification with reference to moral issues (Liberal vs Conservative), whereas economic Left-Right would be based on low vs high Economic Conservatism, low vs high Social Dominance Orientation, and self-identification with reference to economic issues (Social vs Free Market).

First, one can notice considerable coherence among the indicators of the cultural Left-Right: Cultural Conservatism correlates positively with RWA and Liberal vs Conservative self-identification ($r = .57$ and $.35$, respectively; $p \leq .01$). The last two variables are also linked by a positive

Figure 2. The Structure of Preferences for Values (factor loadings)

¹ In the case of ipsative measurement, the scores on each scale are contingent upon scores on the other scales. This procedure does not independently measure intensity of separate characteristics. Instead, it allows for measuring a relative differentiation within the structure of characteristics. As it happened here, the interdependency of the scores may lead to some problems in statistical analyses based on the covariance/correlation matrix.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlation Matrix for Ideological Orientations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Cultural Conservatism (1)						
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (2)	.57**					
Liberalism vs Conservatism (3)	.35**	.36**				
Economic Conservatism (4)	-.32**	-.30**	-.12**			
Social Dominance Orientation (5)	-.17**	-.19**	-.05	.49**		
Social vs Free Market (6)	-.11**	-.12**	.03	.19**	.20**	
M	3.79	4.01	5.07	2.64	3.04	5.12
SD	.85	.53	1.93	.65	.57	1.88

** $p \leq .01$


correlation ($r = .36$; $p \leq .01$). The same conclusion can be drawn for indicators of the economic Left-Right: Economic Conservatism correlates positively with SDO and Social vs Free Market self-identification ($r = .49$ and $.19$, respectively; $p \leq .01$). The last two variables are also linked by a positive correlation ($r = .20$; $p \leq .01$).

A set of coefficients framed by a rectangular line strictly refers to relationships between cultural and economic Left-Right. In general, the correlational pattern almost fully confirmed negative relationships. Cultural and Economic Conservatism as well as RWA and SDO appeared to be negatively correlated ($r = -.32$, and $-.19$, respectively; $p \leq .01$). Their cross-correlations were also negative. Social vs Free Market turned out to be negatively linked with both Cultural Conservatism and RWA ($r = -.11$, and $-.12$, respectively; $p \leq .01$). The only departure from the general pattern was Liberal vs Conservative self-identification correlating negatively with Economic Conservatism ($r = -.12$; $p \leq .01$), but its relations with SDO and Social vs Free Market were nonsignificant.

Test of the model (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3)

The empirical test of hypothesized model was performed by means of Structural Equation Modeling. Figure 3 depicts the full model including both dimensions of the Left and Right defined as latent variables. The cultural dimension consisted of: Cultural Conservatism, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and Liberal vs Conservative self-identification. The economic dimension consisted of Economic Conservatism, Social Dominance Orientation, and Social vs Free Market self-identification. With 16 degrees of freedom, the model turned out to have a highly satisfactory goodness of fit (GFI = .984, CFI = .970, SRMR = .037, RMSEA = .054). A very good fit should be seen as a highly accurate reflection of the latent variables' structure. However, of the most import is detailed analysis of hypothetical inter-relations between the four main variables.

Hypothesis 1: Factor loadings associated with cultural Left-Right evidence substantial coherence among Cultural Conservatism, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and Liberal

Figure 3. Structural Model Linking Preferences for Values and Political Ideology

vs Conservative self-identification (.78, .74 and .47, respectively). On the other hand, factor loadings associated with cultural Left-Right evidence the primarily substantial coherence between Economic Conservatism and Social Dominance Orientation (.77 and .62, respectively), while Social vs Free Market self-identification appears to be less clearly indicative of economic Left-Right (.31). Cultural and economic Left-Right indices enclosed as latent variables were linked by a considerable negative correlation ($r = -.47; p < .01$). This result was highly supportive of hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2a and 2b: Openness to change vs Conservation appeared to be a clear positive predictor of the cultural Left-Right component ($\beta = .39; p \leq .01$) and a marginal positive predictor of the economic component ($\beta = .12; p \leq .05$). On the other hand, Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence was a considerable negative determinant of the economic component ($\beta = -.46; p \leq .01$) but not the cultural one ($\beta = .08; n.s.$). Both dimensions of preferences for values had disparate ideological outcomes: the former determined cultural and the latter determined economic leftism-rightism. Consequently, hypotheses 2a and 2b were fully supported.

Hypothesis 3: Openness to change vs Conservation and Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence were positively related ($r = .48; p < .01$). This positive correlation evidences a clear mental proximity within individualistic characteristics (Openness to change and Self-enhancement) on the one hand and within collectivist characteristics (Conservation and Self-transcendence) on the other. This was fully supportive of hypothesis 3.

Preferences for values as a basis for political polarization (Hypothesis 4)

As it was argued, confirmatory results for hypothesis 3 make a strong premise to predict that a clear difference in both covarying characteristics – individualistic and collectivist – is a principal psychological basis for the

extremely polarized electorates of the two largest parties: Civic Platform and Law'n'Justice. The remarkable domination of CP and L'n'J was also revealed in the current research, as among the respondents who decided to vote in parliamentary election more than 65% declared voting for CP or L'n'J. It is worth noting that the research problem does not refer to the mere fact of political polarization (quite common in many countries), but rather to the fact that the Polish political polarization is not completely subject to explanation in terms of ideological division into the Left and Right. Instead, it was expected to be explained by referring to the specific patterns in preferences for values.

In order to verify these suppositions a discriminant analysis was applied. This method of multivariate data analysis allows for testing the overall linear effect of a set of quantitative explanatory variables on a qualitative outcome variable. Four separate discriminant analyses were performed including the following explanatory variables: 1) Cultural and Economic Conservatism, 2) RWA and SDO, 3) cultural and economic self-identification on the Left-Right, and 4) Openness to change vs Conservation and Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence. The outcome variable had four categories corresponding to the declared will of voting for the four most popular political parties: 1) Civic Platform (CP) – 33.5%, 2) Democratic Left Alliance (DLA) – 9.9%, 3) Polish Peasant Party (PPP) – 5.8%, and 4) Law and Justice (L'n'J) – 29.6%. All of the percentages refer to the number of respondents who declared voting (75.6% out of a total $N = 750$).

Discriminant analysis resulted in a set of discriminant functions, i.e. linear combinations of discriminating (explanatory) variables derived to maximize differences among four electorates of the most popular parties. This method always produces $k-1$ (k – number of groups) discriminant functions, which means three functions in this case. Altogether, these functions quantify between-group variance which can be attributed to the overall effect of the discriminating variables. However, as it is normal that

Table 3. Statistics for the First Discriminant Function

		Standardized coefficients	Structure matrix	η^2
<i>Model 1</i>	Cultural Conservatism	.91	.98	.10
	Economic Conservatism	-.21	-.52	
<i>Model 2</i>	Right-Wing Authoritarianism	.97	.99	.13
	Social Dominance Orientation	-.12	-.33	
<i>Model 3</i>	Liberalism vs Conservatism	.98	.99	.20
	Social vs Free Market	.04	.02	
<i>Model 4</i>	Openness to change vs Conservation	.53	.88	.09
	Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence	.66	.80	

² Canonical correlation has the same meaning as η coefficient in ANOVA, which is the ratio of between-group sum of squares to the total sum of squares of a dependent variable. Squared canonical correlation (η^2) quantifies the portion of variance explained by inter-group differences (in this case discriminant function is treated as dependent variable).

the first derived function always explains the remarkable majority of the between-group variance, in the whole series of analyses only the first function turned out to be statistically significant. It captured 99.9%, 95.8%, 88.6%, and 96.6% of the between-group variance in models 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Therefore, the overall interpretation of the results will be based solely on the first function.

The squared canonical correlation (η^2) is usually considered as a statistic that is most informative about a model's goodness of fit². According to η^2 (see Table 3), model 3 – based on Left-Right self-identification – should be pointed out as having decidedly the best explanatory power ($\eta^2 = .20$). Compared to the rest, model 4 – based on preferences for values – appears as the least discriminating, with the power closest to model 1 ($\eta^2 = .09$).

Compared to other models, model 4 – though least predictive – has an interesting peculiarity which is revealed by standardized discriminant coefficients, i.e. statistics showing unique contribution of the separate explanatory variables to the discriminant function. In the models 1, 2, and 3 one may observe a remarkable disproportion between the predictors. As Table 3 shows, the influence of predictors referring to the cultural Left-Right is overwhelming in comparison to the influence of predictors referring to the economic one. Results for model 4 are clearly different. The effects of Openness to change *vs* Conservation and Self-enhancement *vs* Self-transcendence turned out to be similar in their power. The same conclusion can be drawn when looking at the structure matrix coefficients, which show a bivariate correlation between the discriminating variables and the discriminant function.

One may notice that, as in the results of several previous studies (e.g. Pankowski, 1997; Mirkowski & Czeńnik, 2002; Skarżyńska & Henne, 2011), it once again turned out that the political preferences of Poles strongly depend on cultural Left-Right, while economic Left-Right contributes almost nothing. Model 4 shows such a perspective in which Self-enhancement *vs* Self-transcendence is equally important (assuming that this dimension of preferences for values is structuring the political content of economic Left-Right).

Figure 4 depicts the results that seem to be most supportive for hypothesis 4. It shows values of group

centroids representing the average score on the first discriminant function in the party electorates. The scores were derived from the predictors corresponding to the four competing models. In comparison to others, only model 4 – though overall the least discriminating – best reflects the actual polarization of the electorates. This is the case when the electorates of CP and L'n'J constitute the most distinct rival opposites. As it was expected, the electorate of CP reveals a mental profile predominated by individualistic characteristics of Openness to change and Self-enhancement. On the other hand, the mental profile of the L'n'J electorate is predominated by the opposite collectivist characteristics of Conservation and Self-transcendence.

The polarization of CP and L'n'J electorates regarding preferences for values is shown in Figure 5, which depicts the magnitude of differences on both electorates' preferences for the separate characteristics. As one can see, the electorate of CP clearly defines itself in terms of individualistic characteristics, and the electorate of L'n'J emphasizes the importance of collectivist characteristics. Taking into account the most significant differences, the electorate of CP should be first of all described as curious about the world, ambitious, wishing for leadership, and passionately discovering the world, while the electorate of L'n'J as mostly valuing compassion for others, obedience, orderliness, modesty, and self-discipline.

Discussion

It may be argued that among Eastern European liberal democracies Poland is a country that distinguishes itself with the most tangled up dominant patterns as to Left-Right political views. Most Poles harmoniously combine cultural rightism with economic leftism and *vice versa* in their political attitudes. This phenomenon finds its reflection in the political polarization of the society coming across ideological divisions between the Left and Right.

The current paper proposes a theoretical model calling for ideological inconsistency (or consistency) within a given society to be a product of certain predominant psychological patterns appearing in the collective

Figure 4. First Discriminant Function Centroids for the Most Popular Polish Parties





Figure 5. Preferences for Values: Differences between Civic Platform and Law'n'Justice followers


mentality. Based on this model, it was empirically shown that an inconsistent structure of political orientations might be explained as a reflection of some basic personal values structures. On the one hand, it is the covariance of individualistic values comprising Openness to change and Self-enhancement, and on the other hand the covariance of collectivist values including Conservation and Self-transcendence. It was evidenced that two basic dimensions of preferences for values – Openness to change vs Conservation and Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence – were strongly positively related, but had fundamentally different relationships with political ideologies and self-identifications. The former turned out to be a considerable positive predictor of cultural rightism (and negative predictor of cultural leftism), whereas the latter appeared as a negative predictor of economic rightism (and positive predictor of economic leftism).

Based on the presented results it may be argued that incoherence at the ideological level, which is characteristic of the Polish society, can be seen as a product of coherence at the deeper psychological level. This implies a clear separation of the two distinct levels – ideological and psychological – which seems to also be fruitful for explaining the phenomenon of strong political polarization in Poland. Neither self-identifications on cultural and economic Left vs Right nor relevant ideological variables can satisfactorily explain the political preferences of the Polish electorate. Seeking the fundamental line of division, one should consider rather “the clash of personal values” than of political ideologies. Strong political polarization seems to be just reflecting a fundamental difference of mental characteristics – individualistic (Civic Platform) on the one hand and collectivist (Law'n'Justice) on the other. Four major political parties can reasonably be put in order based on the function derived from Openness to change vs

Conservation and Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence. In that case, the two largest and most conflict-ridden parties clearly take both extremes of the political continuum. It is worth noting that the psychological characteristics of the two polarized electorates seem to fit quite well to the propaganda slogan created during the 2005 parliamentary campaign, regarded as a starting point of the current political conflict. At that time, major political parties – CP and L'n'J – were positioned as the camp of ‘liberalism’ and ‘social solidarity’, respectively.

The model tested in this paper refers to the characteristics of collective mentality observable in a given society. However, all of the empirical results presented here should be seen as relative rather than absolute in meaning. The domination of CV and L'n'J electorates shows the largest social potential in terms of mental characteristics, i.e. individualistic and collectivist. It doesn't mean that Polish society is – for example – entirely deprived of social groups with mental profiles harmoniously combining characteristics of, on the one hand, Openness to change and Self-transcendence, or, on the other hand, Self-enhancement and Conservation. This rather means that – in terms of quantity – the social potential for political undertakings appealing to such mental profiles is very limited. Indeed, in the last twenty six years neither political movement in Poland drawing from ideas of the New Left (expressing motivational goals of Openness to change and Self-transcendence) or neoconservatism (expressing motivational goals of Self-enhancement and Conservation) could find considerable social support.

For quite many social scientists it is very tempting to describe and explain political attitudes in such countries as Poland (and other Eastern European democracies) from the normative perspective of long-standing Western democracies. In consequence, political divisions in

these countries may be seen as unstable or not yet fully crystallized, still remaining at the stage of creation or based on different premises, etc. From the perspective of the current paper, political ideologies and preferences can be regarded as unstable or not crystallized insofar as the underlying collective mentality patterns seem to be so. But that is rather not the case here.

The underlying mental patterns should primarily be seen as a long-lasting outcome of past societal experiences and the dynamics of contemporary socio-political processes. In the Polish reality, the most important input contributed by the past is the period of so called real socialism dating from 1944 to 1989. In turn, the last quarter of the century, began by the systemic change in 1989, is the input of the present. It was characteristic of the former period that top-down driven prevalence of leftist values in the economic sphere was merged with conservative attitudes of the vast majority of people in the cultural sphere (strongly reinforced by the Catholic Church, which was seen as the mainstay of national identity). The period after systemic change in 1989 brought a lot of cultural liberalism and pro-modern openness to the world, but it was also the time of neoliberal attitudes and values prevailing in the economic sphere. No doubt these two cultural dominants are clearly reflected in Polish collective mentality and political polarization.

At least three important limitations of the present study should be pointed out: lack of a comparative study, causality, and a problem of predictive power. At the same time the first and the second one seem to be implications for future research. The model presented in this paper posits four links (see Figure 1). It was assumed that relationships of both dimensions of preferences for values with cultural and economic Left-Right are independent of a cultural context. However, it was hypothesized that if – as in Poland – cultural and economic Left-Right are negatively related, it must be preceded by a positive link between Openness to change vs Conservation and Self-enhancement vs Self-transcendence. These links depend on cultural context. Since in Western democracies cultural and economic Left-Right are positively related, the link between both dimensions of preferences for values should be negative, which entails substantial covariances of Openness to change and Self-transcendence on the one hand, and Self-enhancement and Conservation on the other hand. Therefore, a comparative study should be conducted to thoroughly verify the validity of the model.

As to the second point, it should be stressed that the correlational research design does not allow for explicit inferences of causal direction from preferences for values to cultural and economic Left-Right. A longitudinal approach would be needed to give a clearer picture of the likely causal direction of the relations among the measured constructs. It is also quite probable that such causal influences could be reciprocal, i.e. personal values do not only have a one-way affect on political ideology but can also be reinforced by the motivational goals built into the ideology.

Finally, it must be noted that the presented approach revealed rather limited predictive power with regard to political preferences. The approach based on preferences for values seems to have important explanatory advantages over and above contrasted models (bi-dimensional Left-Right self-identification, cultural and economic conservatism, RWA and SDO), but the models using ideological variables and self-identifications better predict political preferences. The proposed model probably primarily shows a psychological profile of the prototypical 'core' voter. It is very predictive in terms of the preferred political ideology, but at the end it is political ideology and especially political self-identification that most influences political choices.

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