

V e n a n z i o   R a s p a

## Meinong and Twardowski on Representations and Judgements

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Between Alexius Meinong's and Kazimierz Twardowski's writings there is a terminological and conceptual resemblance, which can be explained in part by their being both pupils of Franz Brentano and attentive readers of Bernard Bolzano, in part – as scholars have pointed out – by the apparent thematic affinities between Twardowski's *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen* (1894) and Meinong's object theory (cf. Hicks 1922, p. 18; Findlay 1963 [1933], p. 8; Lenoci 1972, p. 18; Grossmann 1974, pp. 48, 50; Haller 1982, p. ix; Woleński 1989, pp. 35–36; Smith 1989, p. 314; 1994, p. 156). Many people regard *Zur Lehre* as a link between Brentano's descriptive psychology and Meinong's object theory (as well as Edmund Husserl's phenomenology) (cf. Jordan 1963, p. 5; Grossmann 1977, p. VII; Besoli 1988, pp. 7–8)<sup>1</sup>. But this is not my main concern here. I do not propose to determine whether Twardowski set out the features of a theory of objects before Meinong did (cf. Ingarden 1939–1946, p. 23; Smith 1989, p. 321), or whether Meinong picked up on and perfected what Twardowski had said in a sketchy way (see, e.g., Findlay 1963 [1933], p. 17). The correspondence between Meinong and Twardowski, which extends from 1893 to 1916, shows that they mainly discuss representations and judgements. I will focus on these topics: (1) judgements and their content, (2) conceptual representations and represented judgements.

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<sup>1</sup> I share this view: see Raspa (1999, p. 229 ff.; 2002a, p. 57 ff.; 2016b; 2018).

I will show not only that Meinong read Twardowski, but also that Twardowski, more generous in valuing and appreciating his correspondent's writings, was an attentive reader of Meinong.

## 1. Judgements and Their Content

The relationship between the two philosophers began when in December 1893 Twardowski sent Meinong a copy of his *Zur Lehre*, which bears the publication year of 1894 but was already printed on 1 December 1893<sup>2</sup>. Meinong thanks him and remarks that the book contains a lot of stimulating suggestions relevant to the problems he is focusing on (cf. Meinong to Twardowski, Graz, 23 December 1893, in Meinong, Twardowski 2016, pp. 75–76). A few years later, on 11 June 1897, Twardowski writes to Meinong that he is working on a theory of judgement centred around the distinction between act, content and object (cf. Twardowski to Meinong, Lwów, 11 July 1897, in Meinong, Twardowski 2016, p. 85). Meinong replies that he has read “many useful things [*so viel Förderliches*]”<sup>3</sup> in *Zur Lehre*, has found some questionable claims, and has toyed with the idea of reviewing the book for the “Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen” – which in the end he did not do (cf. Meinong to Twardowski, Windischgarsten, 22 July 1897, in Meinong, Twardowski 2016, p. 92). In his letter of 25 July 1897, Twardowski regrets that Meinong failed to review *Zur Lehre* and claims he would now write some things differently, others he would not write at all (“würde ich heute Manches anders, Manches gar nicht schreiben”; Twardowski to Meinong, Lwów, 25 July 1897, in Meinong, Twardowski 2016, p. 95). But he does not mean to disavow all results achieved in that work. To get clear about what Meinong regarded as interesting or questionable, we need to open Twardowski's *Zur Lehre*.

1.1. In § 2, Twardowski describes the act of judging as analogous to that of representing: only if the object can be represented (in a modifying sense) can it also be judged, and only in this sense is the object present *in* the judgement. And just as in a representation, in addition to the object represented *by* it, there is the object represented *in* it, i.e. the content, so in the judgement, next to the object it refers to, there appears the content. To affirm or to deny means to state whether the object with which the judgement is concerned exists or not. Therefore – concludes Twardowski – the content of a judgement is the existence (or non-existence) of the object with which every judgement is concerned. But

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<sup>2</sup> On the reasons for this dating see Meinong, Twardowski (2016, pp. 75–76, n. 1).

<sup>3</sup> Unless stated otherwise, all translations of citations are my own.

what is really judged – he points out – is the object itself (*der Gegenstand selbst*). It is judged *by means* of the content, which mediates between the mental act and the object. An analogy is thus established between the two kinds of mental experiences (*Erlebnisse*): in both there is a *mental act*, representing or judging; they both refer to “an *object* which is presumed to be independent of thinking”; “in both cases there occurs a third thing, besides the mental act and its object, which is, as it were, a sign of the object: its mental ‘picture’ when it is represented and its existence when it is judged” (Twardowski 1894, p. 9; Eng. trans. 1977, p. 7).

(i) Twardowski distinguishes the content of a representation from the content of a judgement, which he identifies with the existence of the object. He fails to explain, however, what it means that the existence of the object corresponds to the immanent object, which he identifies with the content. Moreover, it is unclear whether existence, since the content is mental, is mental as well<sup>4</sup>. If it is not, then the analogy between the two kinds of mental experiences is no longer valid, because only the content of a representation is mental, not that of a judgement, i.e. the existence (or non-existence) of the object (cf. Cavallin 1997, pp. 89–90). In addition, like Brentano (and Bolzano), (ii) Twardowski does not yet distinguish a specific object of a judgement from that of a representation, but considers them as referring to the same object<sup>5</sup>. This is clear from several passages:

The very same object which in one case is merely represented, can in another case also be judged; it can be affirmed or denied (Twardowski 1894, p. 8; Eng. trans. 1977, p. 6).

The real object of the representation and judgment, however, is neither the mental picture of the object nor its existence, but the object itself (Twardowski 1894, p. 9; Eng. trans. 1977, p. 7).

Every object of a representation can be object of a judgment and object of an emotion (Twardowski 1894, p. 38; Eng. trans. 1977, p. 35).

As his letter to Meinong of 11 July 1897 shows, Twardowski changed his mind on the two points just mentioned:

In each judgement must be distinguished 1.) act (affirmation or denial) 2.) content: existing, being present [*Vorhandensein*], subsisting 3.) object (the judged state of affairs [*Sachverhalt*], = either an absolute datum, or a relation, or both together). Example: “God exists”: object: God; content: existence; act: affirmation. Or: “two times two is four”: object: equality between the product of two times two is four; content: the existence (subsistence) of this equality; act: affirmation (Twardowski to Meinong, Lwów, 11 July 1897, in Meinong, Twardowski 2016, p. 85).

<sup>4</sup> Doubts about it have been expressed by Smith (1989, p. 337) and Besoli (2002, p. 222).

<sup>5</sup> On the relationship and the differences between the theory of judgement supported here by Twardowski and that of Brentano, see Besoli (2002, pp. 213–216).

Therefore, (i) the content can also consist in subsisting, not only in existing, and (ii) the object is no longer the object of a representation, but the state of affairs, the *Sachverhalt*.

This letter does not provide much information on these points. For example, it is not clear whether subsistence is different from existence or is just an explanation of existence because the content does not exist in the way in which objects do. More material can be found in the manuscript of the lectures on logic that Twardowski gave at the University of Vienna in the winter semester 1894/95 (cf. Twardowski 2016), and repeated in Lwów in the winter semester 1895/96<sup>6</sup>. Compared to the *Habilitationsschrift* there are substantial confirmations as well as some new ideas.

The first novelty about the content of a judgement lies in the account of a kind of non-existing objects that went unexamined in *Zur Lehre*, i.e. past objects, which used to exist but no longer do. If the proposition “One (a certain individual) was a king [*ein war ein König*]” is true, then it affirms the existence of someone who no longer exists, which is contradictory.

Therefore, the content of a judgement is not always the existence in the proper sense, but also the *subsisting* of a relation, regardless of whether the members of the relation itself exist (Twardowski 2016, Bl. 32r).

Twardowski views the existential proposition as the fundamental form of judgement (cf. Twardowski 2016, Bl. 33), but he denies that all judgements are existential; unlike Brentano, he considers this opinion to be “untenable” precisely on the basis of the previous argument about past objects (cf. Twardowski 2016, Bl. 119). Next to existential judgements he places judgements on a relation, which he mentioned in passing in *Zur Lehre* (cf. Twardowski 1894, pp. 27–28; Eng. trans. 1977, p. 25). These are not reducible to the former but constitute a specific class (cf. Twardowski 2016, Bl. 118–119)<sup>7</sup>. In the case of an existential judgement, the content is the *existence* (or non-existence) of the object, as Twardowski argued in *Zur Lehre*. By contrast, in the case of a judgement on a relation, the content is the *subsistence* of the relation, regardless of whether its members exist or not. Moreover, while existence is univocal, and therefore there are no sub-types of existential judgements, there are as many types of content as there are types of relations, and hence several types

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. Twardowski, *Logika. Kurs zimowy 1895/6* [Logic. Winter term 1895/6] in: *Archiwum Kazimierza Twardowskiego*, P. 5, 1, P. 9, 7. Twardowski’s archive is available in the Połączone Biblioteki WFiS UW, IFiS PAN i PTF (Assembled Libraries of the Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology of the University of Warsaw, of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences and of the Polish Philosophical Society).

<sup>7</sup> On past objects and judgements about a relation see van der Schaar (2016, p. 98 ff.)

of judgements about relations<sup>8</sup>. In this way, Twardowski distances himself from Brentano and radically recasts his teacher's theory of judgement. Furthermore, he anticipates Meinong's distinction between existence and subsistence – even though Meinong views this distinction as structural and not as applying only to the content of judgments.

The second innovation has to do with the object. The object of an existential judgement is still the same as the object of a representation, while that of a judgement on a relation is a different one. First, since each relation has at least two elements, the corresponding object will always be a compound one (cf. Twardowski 2016, Bl. 34), whereas the object of an existential judgement can be “non-analysed [*unanalysiert*]” (Twardowski 2016, Bl. 139), i.e. an individual. Secondly, a relation can also subsist between non-existing component parts. Even though in the *Logik* Twardowski does not yet use the term *Sachverhalt*, he does refer to it when speaking of the object of a judgement on a relation (for more details, see Betti, Raspa 2016, pp. XXIV–XXVII). As objects of judgement, relations are not as mental as contents, but they enrich the inventory of the world. Twardowski does not say – as Meinong will – that they are ideal objects, but these seem to be around the corner.

Following Bolzano (cf. Bolzano [1837] 1985–1999, II, § 127, pp. 9–10), Twardowski believes that the deep structure of judgements about relations is “*A* has *b*”, where *b* stands for property (*Beschaffenheit*). He argues that having (*das Haben*) is not the same as possessing (*besitzen*), and property is not equivalent to quality (*Eigenschaft*), the latter being rather a particular type of *Beschaffenheit* (cf. Twardowski 2016, Bl. 137–140). There are then two types of judgements about the content: those on the existence and those on having a property, or on the subsistence of a relation.

The *Logik* illuminates what Twardowski writes in his letter to Meinong of 11 July 1897; on the other hand, by introducing the concept of *Sachverhalt*, this letter confirms the interpretation whereby the object of a judgement on a relation coincides with the state of affairs. There is another point where the *Logik* adds something that in *Zur Lehre* is merely touched upon. While discussing Benno Erdmann's theory of judgement and his contention that there are intermediate forms between representations and judgements, Twardowski introduces represented judgements, of which he provides no more than a negative definition with respect to proper judgements. A represented judgement, where “represented” has a modifying function, is not a genuine judgement, which lays a claim to truth; a judgement is true or false, while a represented judgement is not (cf. Twardowski 1894, pp. 6–7; Eng. trans. 1977, pp. 4–5; 2016, Bl. 167r, 195–197, 211). However, Twardowski argues that “represented judgements are

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. Twardowski (2016, Bl. 120 ff.), where Twardowski distinguishes fourteen types of judgements about relations (identity, equality, diversity, necessity, causality, etc.).

also communicated by means of propositions” (Twardowski 1894, p. 7; Eng. trans. 1977, p. 5). This implies that represented judgements have a propositional character. In Twardowski’s view, the modal judgement “I do not know whether it will rain tomorrow” expresses a judgement on the represented judgement “It will rain tomorrow” (cf. Twardowski 2016, Bl. 195–196). The latter is not asserted with a claim to truth, it is only thought – in the form of a sentence. As we shall see, Twardowski argues that whenever we seek to understand a theory before formulating a judgement on it, we represent it, in the sense that we conceive the theses constituting that theory without yet ascribing truth to them. Despite Twardowski’s claim to the contrary in *Zur Lehre*, the propositional character of represented judgements, which representations lack, makes them into an intermediate form between representations and judgements. As we will see, this form has some strong similarities with Meinong’s assumptions.

1.2. As he claims in his letter of 22 July 1897, Meinong considers the issue of the relations between act, content and object to be so complex that he doubts he has managed to offer a definitive account of it. From *Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung* ([1899] 1971) to *Über emotionale Präsentation* ([1917] 1968), he will reflect and clarify his ideas about the distinction between content and object, object of a representation (*Objekt*) and object of a judgement (*Objektiv*). His perspective is close to that of Twardowski. Meinong discusses judgements on a relation, which are not reducible to existential judgements, in his review of *Die neuen Theorien der kategorischen Schlüsse* by Franz Hillebrand (cf. Meinong ([1892] 1978)<sup>9</sup>). On this issue, the two philosophers independently arrive at similar results.

In the fragment *Über Inhalt und Gegenstand* ([1908] 1978, p. 147, n. 1), Meinong describes *Zur Lehre* as “perceptive research, which is evidently supported throughout – if somehow unconsciously – by an object-theoretical interest”. However, while recognising the essential contribution Twardowski had given to object theory, in his writings Meinong rarely mentions him. When he does, it is always with regard to the question of content and object, even though he fails to engage in a proper discussion with the Polish philosopher. Twardowski’s name occurs in *Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung*, where Meinong merely writes in a footnote that *Zur Lehre* is “very stimulating and instructive”, but that “a detailed discussion of it would lead too far” ([1899] 1971, *Alexius Meinong Gesamtausgabe* [hereinafter: *GA*] 2, p. 381, n. 1; Eng. trans. 1978a, p. 141, n. 1), in some annotations in the *Nachlass* – in the *Bemerkungen zu*

<sup>9</sup> Meinong invited Twardowski to read this review, where he discusses the theory of judgement and criticises many of Brentano’s ideas on the matter; cf. Meinong to Twardowski, Graz, 2 July 1897, in Meinong, Twardowski (2016, p. 82). Cf. also Raspa (2016b, pp. 58–60).

E. Husserl's "*Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*" ([1913–1914] 1978, *GA. Ergänzungsband*, p. 315) and in an addition (*Zusatz*) to *Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften* ([1906–1907] 1973, *GA 5*, p. 608) – and in *Über emotionale Präsentation*, where Meinong remarks that the issue of the distinction between content and object has remained essentially the same since Twardowski dealt with it, although interesting suggestions have come from Husserl and Theodor Lipps (cf. Meinong [1917] 1968, *GA 3*, pp. 338–339; Eng. trans. 1972, p. 49)<sup>10</sup>.

Let us go back to our starting questions: what are the many useful things that Meinong found in *Zur Lehre*? And what are the theses he criticises? As numerous scholars have shown (see *supra*, nn. 1–2), Meinong accepts the two main arguments by which Twardowski supports the validity of the distinction between content and object: (T1) the content exists even if the object does not; (T2) the object of a representation has properties that cannot in any way relate to the content (cf. Meinong [1899] 1971, *GA 2*, pp. 382–384; Eng. trans. 1978a, pp. 141–142). In Meinong's view, as in Twardowski's, the object is the referent of our mental experiences and is independent of our knowing it; equally, the object is the *summm genus*<sup>11</sup>. The strongest disagreement is to do with the content.

On Twardowski's account, the content "does form together with the act one single mental reality" (1894, p. 31; Eng. trans. 1977, p. 29), but unlike the act it is never real. Like Twardowski, Meinong distinguishes between reality and existence, but defines the real as what can exist: therefore, what exists is also real (cf. Meinong [1899] 1971, *GA 2*, pp. 394–397, 457; Eng. trans. 1978a, pp. 149–151, 192–193), and the content, like the act, "exists, is real and present, it is also mental" (Meinong [1899] 1971, *GA 2*, p. 384; Eng. trans. 1978a, p. 143; see also Findlay [1933] 1963, pp. 12–13). Moreover, Meinong will not equate immanent object and content of a representation, as Twardowski does (cf. Marek 1995, pp. 346–347). He believes, unlike Twardowski, that it is not always possible to clearly distinguish between content and object. This is easy when the former is mental and the latter physical, but in other cases (i.e. when the object to be apprehended is also a mental experience and self-presentation intervenes<sup>12</sup>) there occurs a quasi-content (*Quasiinhalt*) and "the

<sup>10</sup> For Lipps's view on the distinction between content and object, see Raspa (2002b).

<sup>11</sup> In his *Selbstdarstellung* ([1921] 1978, *GA 7*, p. 14; Eng. trans. 1974, p. 224) Meinong argues that "it is impossible to give a regular definition of object, for genus and differentia are lacking, since everything is an object".

<sup>12</sup> Presenting means that a mental experience offers an object to thought (cf. Meinong [1910] 1969, *GA 4*, p. 244; Eng. trans. 1983, p. 177; [1917] 1968, *GA 3*, p. 288; Eng. trans. 1972, p. 4). If the presenting agent (*der Präsentant*) is the same as the presented (as is the case with internal perception), we speak of "self-presentation" (*Selbstpräsentation*); if it is not, we

two can be similar unto the limit point of identity” (Meinong [1910] 1969, *GA* 4, p. 264; Eng. trans. 1983, p. 190). Despite the differences, both philosophers regard the content as performing the same function: it is the intermediate element necessary for a mental act to refer to an object. But Twardowski’s thesis that the content of a judgement is the existence of the object or the subsistence of a relation finds no favour with Meinong.

Meinong’s reflections on the content of a judgement are scattered throughout several of his writings. In some he just mentions it (cf. Meinong [1899] 1971, *GA* 2, pp. 381, 383–384; Eng. trans. 1978a, pp. 141–143; 1902, pp. 159–160). In others he discusses it in some more detail. For example, in the entry “Urteilsinhalt” of the *Sach-Index zur Logik und Erkenntnistheorie* (Meinong [1888–1903] 1978, *GA. Ergänzungsband*, p. 106), he contends that the content of a judgement is more than the representational content and less than the accomplished judgement. In the second edition of *Über Annahmen* (Meinong [1910] 1969, p. 341; Eng. trans. 1983, p. 243), he says that “just as the content of a representation is best characterizable via the objectum, so too the content of a judgement and the content of an assumption are best characterizable via the objective”. Yet these claims are far from clarifying what the content of a judgement actually is.

The origin of the difficulty lies in the perspective that Meinong adopts. Like Twardowski, he considers the content of a judgement from a psychological, not a semantic point of view. From a psychological point of view, it is actually difficult to distinguish a mental experience and its content, since they are both mental<sup>13</sup>. In *Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit* ([1915] 1972), Meinong distinguishes two senses of content, the logical and the psychological, and acknowledges that he will only deal with the latter (cf. Meinong [1915] 1972, *GA* 6, p. 163, n. 3; [1917] 1968, *GA* 3, p. 345; Eng. trans. 1972, p. 54)<sup>14</sup>. He makes real progress in his view of the content in *Über emotionale Präsen-*

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speak of “other-presentation” (*Fremdpräsentation*) (Meinong [1917] 1968, *GA* 3, p. 291; Eng. trans. 1972, p. 6).

<sup>13</sup> For a careful analysis of Meinong’s view of the psychological content, see Marek (2001, pp. 261–286). His discussion, however, focuses on representations and fails to consider the content of judgements.

<sup>14</sup> In his review of *Zur Lehre* (unpublished at the time), Husserl (1979, pp. 349–350, n.\*) points out a real difficulty affecting Twardowski’s theory: the failure to distinguish between mental content and semantic meaning. The distinction Meinong draws between logical and psychological content shows that he is aware of the point and apparently escapes Husserl’s criticism. However, Meinong fails to offer a clear account of what he means by “logical content”. On the one hand, he claims to be referring to what logic has traditionally called “content” in relation to “extension”; on the other hand, he describes logical content as the proximate object (*nächster Gegenstand*) of the respective concept and – according to further developments in his thought – as an auxiliary object (*Hilfsgegenstand*) (cf. Meinong [1915] 1972, *GA* 6, p. 198; 1978b, p. 400).



tation<sup>15</sup>. Here he provides two arguments to distinguish the content from the mental act.

(i) If I have a representation of the blue of the sky and the green of a meadow, the two experiences apprehending them are in many ways similar, both being perceptual representations; what necessarily makes them different, so that they can refer to two different objects, is their respective contents. From the diversity of the objects we can deduce the diversity of the contents. (ii) Consider two representations, a perceptual representation and a fantasy-representation of the same object, e.g. the note C. The former results from perceiving the note, the latter from remembering it; in the latter case, the note is not precisely the same as in the former because the pitch will not remain absolutely exact. However, whether I perceive the note or remember it, that is, whether I have a perceptual representation or a fantasy-representation, the object apprehended by means of such representations remains the same. If the object is the same, so will be the content, while the variation will affect the act. From this double variability – of the content while the act remains identical and of the act while the content remains the same – we can deduce the duplicity of the components of the mental experience (cf. Meinong [1917] 1968, *GA* 3, p. 339 ff.; Eng. trans. 1972, p. 49 ff.).

Both arguments are about representations. If we apply them to judgements, these too show the same duplicity of act and content. (i) As in our previous example the representation of blue was distinguished from the representation of green by means of the content, so is a judgement that apprehends being from one that apprehends non-being. Moreover, (ii) the same objective (or state of affairs) can be apprehended by both a judgement and an assumption, which are two different mental experiences: a judgement is characterised by degrees of certainty or uncertainty (whereas an assumption by degrees of strength of the moment of conviction) that concern the act, but by no means the content or the object. Meinong then comes to the following general definition of content (cf. Meinong [1917] 1968, *GA* 3, pp. 346–347; Eng. trans. 1972, pp. 54–55)<sup>16</sup>:

the content is that part of an experience [*Erlebnis*] which is so coordinated with the object to be apprehended by the experience, more precisely with the object immediately presented by the latter, that it varies or remains constant with the object (Meinong [1917] 1968, *GA* 3, p. 347; Eng. trans. 1972, p. 55, with modifications)<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> In this work Meinong deals not only with the content of representations and judgements, but also with that of feelings and desires; cf. Raspa (2016a, p. 194 ff.; 2018, pp. 42–45).

<sup>16</sup> On the graduality of judgements and assumptions see Raspa (2005b, pp. 100–101, 121–124).

<sup>17</sup> See also Meinong ([1917] 1968, *GA* 3, p. 339; Eng. trans. 1972, p. 49; [1906] 1973, *GA* 5, p. 425; [1921] 1978, *GA* 7, p. 23).

The distinction between act and content is related to Meinong's theory of presentation (*Präsentation*). This theory starts from the assumption (shared by Brentano, Twardowski and Meinong) that representations are the basic mental experiences and must necessarily be presupposed by other experiences for the apprehension (*Erfassen*) of an object. Representations are therefore indispensable to knowledge, they are the "psychological presuppositions" (*psychologische Voraussetzungen*) of judgements. The psychological presuppositions of an experience prepare the apprehension of an object. That is why the content of an experience presents its object to thought. The judgement "The sky is blue" needs the representations of the sky and of blue as psychological presuppositions; the contents of these psychological presuppositions present respectively the object sky and the property blue to thought. By virtue of its correlation to the object, the content, understood as a psychological, not as a logical content, offers it to thought. The agent of presentation (*der Präsentant*) is always the content (cf. Meinong [1917] 1968, *GA* 3, p. 288; Eng. trans. 1972, p. 4), which is a part of the mental experience<sup>18</sup>.

By introducing the function of the *Präsentant*, Meinong makes decisive progress in his conception of the content: it is that part of an experience through which an object is presented to thought, whereas the content of a judgement is that by means of which an objective (a state of affairs) is presented to thought. Thus, he provides if not a true definition, certainly a detailed description of the content of a judgement; furthermore, he shows that content and act of judgement are distinguishable, although – as Twardowski had already argued – the former cannot occur without the latter.

## 2. Conceptual Representations and Represented Judgements

On 1 May 1898, Twardowski informed Meinong that he had sent him separately a recent publication, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia* [Images and Concepts] [1898] 1965), where he develops the line of research pursued in *Zur Lehre*. In this work Twardowski aims to solve a problem about intuitive and non-intuitive representations raised by Meinong, and discusses two of his correspondent's writings, *Hume-Studien II* ([1882] 1971) and especially *Phantasie-Vorstellung und Phantasie* ([1889] 1969). Since the book was written in Polish, Meinong was unable to read it, as Twardowski feared (cf. Twardowski to Meinong, Lwów, 1 May 1898, in Meinong, Twardowski 2016, pp. 100–101); but four

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<sup>18</sup> For more details on the theory of presentation, see Findlay ([1933] 1963, pp. 303–321); Schubert Kalsi (1972, pp. xxix–lxvii); Raspa (2013, p. 216 ff.; 2016a, p. 186 ff.).

years later, on 18 November 1902, Twardowski gave a lecture at the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna entitled *Über begriffliche Vorstellungen*, in which he briefly set out the book's argument (cf. Twardowski 1903)<sup>19</sup>. On 17 January 1903, Meinong sent Twardowski a letter (now unfortunately lost) praising that lecture, as proved by Twardowski's reply (cf. Twardowski to Meinong, Lwów, 25 January 1903, in Meinong, Twardowski 2016, p. 117).

In *Über begriffliche Vorstellungen* (1903) Twardowski presents the distinction between intuitive (*anschauliche*) and non-intuitive (*unanschauliche*) representations as a shared view. It is a fact that some things (like a house, a tree, a triangle) can be represented intuitively, while others cannot, either by their nature (God, atoms) or because they exceed the threshold of our representational capacity (I can have an intuitive representation of a pentagon, not a chiliagon)<sup>20</sup>. But – Twardowski asks – how does this non-intuitive representation come about? How can it be described? These questions are relevant not only from a theoretical point of view, but also to understand the evolution of Twardowski's thought, for in this essay he goes far beyond the view that representation and depiction coincide, whereas in *Zur Lehre* he sometimes speaks of the content as a mental picture. Twardowski finds the answers to these questions, or at least a hint about how to look for them, in Meinong's essay *Phantasie-Vorstellung und Phantasie* (cf. Twardowski to Meinong, Lwów, 25 January 1903, in Meinong, Twardowski 2016, p. 117).

2.1. Twardowski must have been particularly sympathetic to this essay, because in it Meinong applies the method of conceptual analysis. In this case, he applies it to “fantasy” and “fantasy-representation” (*Phantasievorstellung*).

Meinong conceives fantasy as a dispositional concept, whose correlate is not a judgement, a feeling or a desire, but a representation, more precisely, a fantasy-representation. He claims that this cannot be a mere reproduction of a previous representation or non-intuitive representation. He defines fantasy as

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<sup>19</sup> Of this German essay Twardowski himself produced a translation into Polish, which appeared in 1924 and was subsequently translated into English (1999b). Actually, as the translator Artur Szylewicz points out, the Polish version contains some deviations from the original. In the following pages my main reference will be the German text, but I will also rely on the English version.

<sup>20</sup> In *Zur Lehre* Twardowski discusses non-intuitive representations in relation to general objects. On his account, I cannot have an intuitive representation of – say – a general triangle, but I can have an indirect representation of it through a single triangle, just as I cannot have an intuitive representation of a horse in general, but I can have a representation of a single horse. Therefore, to have a non-intuitive representation of a general object, multiple intuitive representations of single objects are necessary. This means that the object of a general representation is different from the object of a single representation that makes possible that representation.

“the capacity for an intuitive production of representations” (Meinong [1889] 1969, *GA* 1, p. 198): production and intuitiveness (*Anschaulichkeit*) are then the two main characteristics of fantasy. Here I will focus on intuitiveness and its opposite, i.e. non-intuitiveness (*Unanschaulichkeit*).

Meinong’s concept of intuition is problematic. In his view, we can speak of intuition only when we are perceiving something or at least have the possibility of doing so. Intuition and perception, however, do not coincide, because perception has judgement as its constituent part, whereas intuition does not (cf. Meinong [1889] 1969, *GA* 1, p. 231). Nor is intuition identical with perceptual representation as such, because there are perceptual representations (such as hallucinations) which are not intuitions (cf. Meinong [1888–1889] 1969, *GA* 1, p. 141). “Intuition”, Meinong ([1889] 1969, *GA* 1, p. 232) writes, “is the perceptual representation underlying a real or possible perceptual judgement”. Yet he will not identify, as might seem obvious, the intuitive with the concrete, because the intuitive can also be the result of abstraction by means of attention. For it is only rarely that the interest of someone perceiving by intuition (*des Anschauenden*) is directed to the totality of the characteristics of the perceived object; they mostly make a choice and leave out what they regard as uninteresting. Moreover, Meinong will not identify intuition and intuitive representation, because – he argues – there are intuitive imaginative representations which are not intuitions (cf. Meinong [1889] 1969, *GA* 1, pp. 232–233). How can we then distinguish the intuitive from the non-intuitive?

To illustrate this distinction Meinong uses an example. During a conversation someone speaks of a red chalkboard. Since the listener has so far seen only blackboards, the expression “red chalkboard” should induce them to produce a neoformation (*Neubildung*), whose components are determined by the words “chalkboard” and “red”. But these are general words, therefore the components are not completely determined. To integrate what words cannot provide us, we need to look elsewhere; whether the neoformation is intuitive or not depends on the outcome of the integration required. Let us suppose the word “red” produces in the listener the representation of a red sphere and the word “chalkboard” that of a blackboard. They understand that the colour of the sphere belongs to the chalkboard and they combine the two abstract terms (*Abstrakta*) “red” and “chalkboard” to form a complexion, but since a red sphere and a blackboard do not constitute a red chalkboard, they fail to form an intuitive representation of the red board. They would get to such a representation if the substrate of the abstract representation “red” were not the sphere, but a rectangular surface the size of a chalkboard. The same applies to “chalkboard”, which in the substrate should have had the colour red, not black. In the latter case the conjunction between “chalkboard” and “red” is more intimate (*innigere*) than in the other. In the first case, the conjunction of the representations is only indicated (*an-*

*gezeigt*), in the second it is realised (*ausgeführte*)<sup>21</sup>. Of course, one could give many other examples (descriptions of nature or things); whether an intuitive result is achieved is down to the descriptive ability of the speaker, but also the skills of the perceiving subject, who could be content with a non-intuitive understanding of linguistic expressions (cf. Meinong [1889] 1969, *GA* 1, pp. 234–235). The red board can be represented intuitively, but need not be; the activity of the subject is key to arriving at an intuitive or non-intuitive representation.

The transition from non-intuitive to intuitive is not always possible. A first limitation is the law of threshold: concepts of something too small or too large cannot be made intuitive. But even more obvious is the case of a representation of incompatible elements, such as a round square. Meinong traces non-intuitiveness back to incompatibility: a complex representation free from incompatibility is intuitive (cf. Meinong [1889] 1969, *GA* 1, pp. 236–237, 240, 242). Of course, all that is concrete is intuitive, but not all abstract representations are non-intuitive. Intuitions and concepts are opposite from a practical point of view, but they do not exactly correspond to the intuitive/non-intuitive pair, because “there are abstract intuitions and perhaps even intuitive concepts” (Meinong [1889] 1969, *GA* 1, p. 243).

2.2. According to Twardowski, in *Phantasie-Vorstellung und Phantasie* Meinong argues that in some cases whether a representation is intuitive or not depends on the subject, and he provides helpful examples to make sense of the essence of non-intuitive representations. The overview Twardowski offers in *Über begriffliche Vorstellungen* did not include a part of *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, i.e. the paragraphs where he discusses the characteristics of intuitions (concreteness, intuitiveness and indeterminacy) and (see especially § 6) challenges Meinong’s conception of intuitiveness. He admits that, as we have said above, in Meinong’s view concreteness is peculiar to what is free of abstraction, while intuitiveness to what is free of contradiction. But he rejects Meinong’s definition of abstraction as the result of an unequal distribution of attention which, by concentrating on certain characteristics of an object, disregards the others, so that some characteristics are present to consciousness much more clearly and vividly than others. In Meinong’s view, this means that – as we have seen – there are abstract and non-concrete intuitions as well; and, on Twardowski’s account, this means that *every* intuition is more or less abstract, since the objects we are given in experience never attract our attention in their entirety (cf. Twardowski [1898] 1965, pp. 135–136; Eng. trans. 1995, pp. 95–

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<sup>21</sup> In this essay Meinong critically reconsiders the conceptual pair indicated/realised and proposes replacing it with non-intuitive/intuitive ([1889] 1969, *GA* 1, pp. 237–238), but he uses it again in *Über Annahmen* (1902, p. 115).

96). In *Über begriffliche Vorstellungen* there is no criticism of Meinong's concept of abstraction, so that Twardowski's theses appear even closer to Meinong's. Picking up on Meinong's discussion of the red board, Twardowski offers two more examples.

In the first he imagines having to decide whether the elliptical lawn in front of the house would look better if it had a pentagonal shape. I can get to an intuitive representation of the pentagonal lawn under the following conditions. I form the representation of the lawn as an ellipse, I evoke in myself the intuitive representation of a pentagon and I become aware that the lawn must possess not the shape of an ellipse, but of the pentagon of which I formed a representation. "When I concentrate hard on this thought [*Bei energischer Festhaltung dieses Gedankens*]" (Twardowski 1903, p. 5; Eng. trans. 1999b, p. 77), the elliptical shape gives way to the pentagonal shape, and I so get to an intuitive representation of the pentagonal lawn.

The expression "When I concentrate hard on this thought" is meant to emphasise the activity of the subject who would not get to the same result without such an effort. Yet this effort does not always succeed. If I formed a representation of something having incompatible properties, e.g. a simultaneously elliptical and square lawn, by no means would I be able – as Meinong claimed – to get to an intuitive representation. Picking up on Meinong's distinction between realised conjunction and indicated conjunction, Twardowski argues that, when there is incompatibility between properties, the conjunction is not *realised*, but only *indicated*. I can make the conjunction of the red board by replacing red with black, and that of the pentagonal lawn by replacing the pentagonal shape with the elliptical one; but I cannot realise the conjunction of an elliptical *and* quadrangular lawn. However, as Twardowski contends following Meinong, this *is* a conjunction; it is only indicated with regard to the anticipated intuitiveness, but "it is realised in the meaning, the mental correlate of the words 'a simultaneously elliptical and square lawn'", while the intuitive conjunction of the red board is realised "in the mental picture" (Twardowski 1903, p. 6; Eng. trans. 1999b, p. 77).

When a representation, whether intuitive or not, comes into being, several activities are involved: according to Twardowski, the difference lies in the latter type of representations lacking something. In the case of an intuitive representation, we have to assemble the material to be combined (for such representations are always complex) and become aware of it; in the previous examples (a chalkboard, a red sphere, an elliptical lawn, the drawing of a pentagon and a square table) memory-representations were used. Twardowski calls the part in which the change is made *substrate representation*: the blackboard that helps me to conceive the red board, the elliptical lawn that becomes pentagonal in my representation. The changing part is usually made up of constituents joined to the substrate representation, some of which are suppres-

sed (black in the red board, the elliptical shape in the square lawn). If this sequence of mental activities leads to an intuitive representation, then an *intimate conjunction* (*innige Verbindung*) of the represented characteristics is produced in addition; when an intuitive representation is not achieved, the first two members of the sequence (the substrate representation and the change it undergoes) are present, but not the intimate conjunction between the characteristics. By “change” Twardowski means the addition of new characteristics, their insertion in place of others, or the simple removal of characteristics from the substrate representation (cf. Twardowski 1903, p. 8; Eng. trans. 1999b, p. 79). The essence of non-intuitive representations can only arise from the analysis of the second member of the sequence. In this discussion, note the reference to represented judgements, which have some similarities with Meinong’s assumptions, as Twardowski himself suggests (cf. Twardowski 1903, p. 12, n.\*; Eng. trans. 1999b, p. 82, n. 23).

Assumptions are a kind of intermediate experience between representations and judgements (cf. Meinong 1902, pp. 2–3; [1910] 1969, *GA* 4, p. 4; Eng. trans. 1983, p. 11). Unlike representations, judgements are active experiences; they are formulated with conviction, or with a claim to truth<sup>22</sup> – indeed they can be true or false; and they are characterised by their position, i.e. by the fact of being affirmative or negative. Assumptions too are active experiences characterised by their position, but are formulated with no claim to truth, i.e. they are *judgements without conviction* (cf. Meinong 1902, p. 257; [1910] 1969, *GA* 4, p. 340; Eng. trans. 1983, p. 242; cf. also Meinong [1910] 1969, *GA* 4, p. 368; Eng. trans. 1983, pp. 262–263; [1921] 1978, *GA* 7, p. 33). This definition does not fully satisfy Meinong, but it is sufficient for our purposes.

Similarly to judgements, assumptions are active intellectual experiences, not passive ones like representations; moreover, there is a substantial correspondence between judgement and assumption as regards their content and object, since what can be judged – e.g. that *A* is (not), or that a certain *A* is (not) *B* – can, “in principle”, also be assumed (cf. Meinong [1910] 1969, *GA* 4, pp. 341, 377; Eng. trans. 1983, pp. 243, 269). Therefore, the criterion of distinction is to be sought in the act, first and foremost in the quality of the act (cf. Meinong [1910] 1969, *GA* 4, pp. 344, 377–378; Eng. trans. 1983, pp. 245, 269; [1921] 1978, *GA* 7, p. 33), upon which supervenes “that quantitative act-factor [*jenes quantitative Aktmoment*] familiar to us as the more and less of judgemental certainty” (Meinong [1910] 1969, *GA* 4, p. 342; Eng. trans. 1983, p. 244). This “quantitative act-factor” is a sign of the close relationship

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<sup>22</sup> Cf. Meinong ([1910] 1969, *GA* 4, p. 357; Eng. trans. 1983, p. 255): “No one can believe, i.e. judge, without implicitly claiming truth for what has been judged”; Meinong ([1917] 1968, *GA* 3, p. 305; Eng. trans. 1972, p. 19): “Each judgement involves the belief that what it judges is true”.

between the degree of certainty and the degree of probability, and is characteristic of conviction. Do assumptions as well present an analogue of the variability of the strength of judgement? Meinong views assumptions (just like judgements) as characterised by variability in the sense of a greater or lesser degree of probability<sup>23</sup>. I leave out the examination of the gradualness peculiar to assumptions<sup>24</sup>. If belief implies position and admits of degree variations down to zero, then assumptions can be defined as “a sort of limit-case of the judgement, characterised by the zero-value of the strength of conviction” (Meinong [1910] 1969, *GA* 4, p. 344; Eng. trans. 1983, p. 245). They are the lower limit of a continuous series of degrees, in which conviction disappears and what is left is only the character of position. Assumptions and judgements are therefore unified in a whole and along with representations produce an ordered series: representation, representation with assumption and representation with judgement (i.e. assumption with conviction) (cf. Meinong [1910] 1969, *GA* 4, p. 367; Eng. trans. 1983, p. 262)<sup>25</sup>. Obviously, there is greater affinity between assumptions and judgements than between assumptions and representations.

We use assumptions in many areas (e.g. games, theatrical representations, lies, hypothetical reasoning), and we use them in understanding: we often understand a proposition without granting our consent, i.e. we do not believe that proposition is true. Understanding does not require conviction, but mere assumption.

Twardowski presupposes a semiotic context, in which an individual hears or reads the description of an unknown perceptual object. To form a representation of it, they must understand the statements that describe the object. Just as understanding a name means evoking in oneself the corresponding mental content, i.e. the representation designated by that term, so understanding a statement could mean evoking the (mental) judgement that constitutes the meaning of the (linguistic) statement. This happens often, but not always, because we often understand statements, but “are simply not in a position to pass the respective judgement – because we have doubts about its correctness or because we are convinced of its falsity” (Twardowski 1903, p. 10; Eng. trans. 1999b, p. 81). In these cases – Twardowski argues – we do not make a judge-

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<sup>23</sup> In the proposition, “Suppose that from a sack of white and black balls, white has been drawn ten times in succession. Then under these conditions there obtains a certain probability of drawing white the eleventh time, too”, both the premise and the conclusion are assumptions, and the conclusion can be said to have greater or lesser probability (cf. Meinong [1910] 1969, *GA* 4, p. 343; Eng. trans. 1983, pp. 244–245).

<sup>24</sup> For a discussion of these questions, also in relation to other experiences, see Raspa (2005a). See also *supra*, n. 16.

<sup>25</sup> Thus, it becomes clear in what sense “an assumption is more than a mere representation and is less than a judgement” (Meinong [1910] 1969, *GA* 4, p. 367; Eng. trans. 1983, p. 262).



ment but form a representation of it. In Twardowski's view, as in Meinong's, conviction (or a claim to truth) is as distinctive a characteristic of judgement as affirming and denying.

Thus, when reading a description, and forming for ourselves on its basis a representation of the described object, we also harbour within ourselves, in addition to the substrate representation which comprises the point of departure for every description, representations of judgements or represented judgements (Twardowski 1903, p. 10; Eng. trans. 1999b, p. 81).

To understand a description, judgements are not necessary; represented judgements (i.e. representations of judgements) are sufficient. This also applies to the cases of the red chalkboard, etc. In Meinong's example, when someone *understands* that the red colour of the sphere belongs to the chalkboard and they combine the two abstract terms "red" and "chalkboard", they do nothing but *represent the judgement* expressed by the assertion "The chalkboard is red". Likewise, to represent to myself the lawn that is (and I know to be) elliptical as pentagonal, I do not formulate a real judgement, but a represented judgement: I say to myself "mentally" that the lawn must have a pentagonal shape. More precisely, we are dealing here with a mental complexion consisting of a sequence of representations: the reproduced representation of the elliptical lawn, the representation of judgement (that the lawn has a pentagonal shape) whose subject is the object of the substrate representation (the elliptical lawn), and obviously the attribution of the pentagonal form to the lawn by the represented judgement. The mental complexion of these representations constitutes the non-intuitive representation Meinong refers to, the merely indicated conjunction. Thus, Twardowski arrives at the following definition of a non-intuitive, or conceptual, representation, or simply a concept:

that representation of an object which is composed of a (substrate) representation of an object that is similar to the object at issue and of representations of judgments that pertain to that similar object (Twardowski 1903, p. 13; Eng. trans. 1999b, p. 83).

In *Über begriffliche Vorstellungen* Twardowski works with Meinongian concepts. He aims to clarify what a non-intuitive representation – whose connection between the parts is only indicated, not realised – consists of. In doing so, he introduces represented judgements which, like Meinong's assumptions, can be described as intermediate experiences (*Erlebnisse*) between representations and judgements. Twardowski denies this, but his use of "represented judgement" as a synonym for "representation of a judgement" is further proof that it is precisely an intermediate experience between the other two. Furthermore, some affinities between Meinong's assumptions and Twardowski's represented judgements are evident. Like assumptions, represented judgements lay no claim to truth, are affirmative or negative, and play an essential role in

understanding. This does not mean that the two notions are identical, but that both thinkers are attempting to account for sentences which are asserted without judgemental force, i.e. without laying claim to truth.

This requirement is not new. Bolzano had already drawn a distinction between a true judgement and a thought or represented proposition (cf. Bolzano [1837] 1985–1999, Part 1, § 34, pp. 155, 157): the latter is thought but not asserted (*behauptet*). I can think the proposition that there are pygmies, without judging, i.e. without committing myself to the truth of such a proposition. One type of propositions that are only thought and not asserted are problematic propositions. Bolzano does not doubt that thought or represented propositions are propositions, but he argues that they are propositions without judgemental force; we might say that he is talking about propositions without Gottlob Frege's sign of assertion.

Anton Marty also deals with the same problem when criticising Meinong. He claims that an assumption is not a judgement without conviction, but a represented judgement. Following Brentano, Marty aims to deny the existence of a class of experiences intermediate between representations and judgements (cf. Marty 1906, pp. 28–29; 1908, p. 269). He distinguishes the class of *Urteilssuggestive*, or actual sentences, from the class of *Vorstellungssuggestive*. In the latter he includes “literary narratives, hence apparent assertions” and certain apparent performative, optative and imperative propositions of the poet (cf. Marty 1908, p. 474). But that the propositions of a novel are apparent propositions is far from obvious, and the same goes for lies. We could agree that they are not judgements. And yet represented judgements are not mere representations, because they have a propositional character and also because they require an activity on the part of the subject – this, as we have seen, was Twardowski's argument.

Twardowski may have had Bolzano's text in mind<sup>26</sup>. If this is so, he recasts Bolzano's concept of a thought proposition within the framework of descriptive psychology. As already mentioned, a represented judgement is not a judgement laying claim to truth. This is why Twardowski too considers Kant's problematic judgements to be represented judgements, whereas true judgements are only assertoric or apodictic ones (cf. Twardowski 2016, Bl. 210–211). Subsequently, Twardowski speaks of represented judgements as “artificial, surrogate sentences that are not expressions of actual judgements” (Twardowski [1912] 1965, p. 238; Eng. trans. 1999c, pp. 129–130)]. However, he speaks of sentences (*Aussagen*) and the examples he gives are lies, or the sentences the logician may employ and which may also be false judgements – if, e.g., he intends to explain the difference between formal truth and material truth. In Twardowski's view, such sentences belong to Marty's class of *Vor-*

<sup>26</sup> As van der Schaar (2016, p. 109) suggests.

*stellungssuggestive*. But although they have no judgemental force, represented judgements are sentences that are either uttered (e.g. on a stage) or thought (as when we try to understand a theory or description). Like assumptions, they therefore differ from true judgements in that they lay no claim to truth, but at the same time they also differ from representations by their propositional character – since they are thought sentences. For I must conceive a represented judgement if I want to understand a description or represent a non-intuitive representation. And this requires an active effort on the part of the subject. All this makes represented judgements, like assumptions, into an intermediate element between representations and judgements.

Twardowski does not go so far as to claim this. Recently the expression “unperformed judgements” has been used to refer to represented judgements (Dubucs and Miskiewicz 2009), so that the term “represented” seems to mean simply “thought” or “conceived” (see also Twardowski [1912] 1965, p. 238, n. 42; Eng. trans. 1999c, p. 130, n. 58). This is all about accounting for forms of sentences that are not judgements – but neither are they mere representations, if they have a propositional form, as the examples given by all the authors mentioned show. As a matter of fact, the radical distinction between judgements and representations does not hold.

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In the late spring of 1904, the two philosophers met in Graz and could talk face to face. Twardowski was interested in visiting the Psychology Laboratory founded by Meinong. We do not know much about this meeting. It could have been the beginning of a deeper relationship, judging by a letter that Twardowski wrote a few months after going back to Lwów (cf. Twardowski to Meinong, Lwów, 2 December 1904, in Meinong, Twardowski 2016, pp. 128–130); but Meinong replied with a simple postcard (cf. Meinong to Twardowski, Graz, 12 January 1905, in Meinong, Twardowski 2016, p. 132). For reasons unknown to us, after 1904 the intellectual bond between Meinong and Twardowski loosened and turned into a formal relationship between colleagues.

In the winter semester 1910/11, Twardowski taught a course in logic, in which he dealt with Meinong’s objective (cf. Twardowski to Meinong, Lwów, 26 June 1912, in Meinong, Twardowski 2016, p. 136). On 28 June 1914, Twardowski wrote to Meinong that his name was the one he most mentioned in his lectures along with those of Brentano and Alois Höfler (cf. Twardowski to Meinong, Lwów, 28 June 1914, in Meinong, Twardowski 2016, p. 137). To add some more details to the picture outlined here one should delve into Twardowski’s *Nachlass*, which, as he himself claims (cf. Twardowski 1991, p. 18; Eng. trans. 1999a, p. 30) and Ingarden confirms (cf. Ingarden 1939–

1946, p. 18), contains a good deal of material he discussed in class, but did not publish.

Meinong and Twardowski were aware that they were working on partly related issues. Meinong realised that Twardowski's text addressed similar issues to those he was focusing on, but he failed to point out this affinity as he did with Husserl. However, not only did Twardowski play a significant role in the development of Meinong's philosophy, but Meinong offered quite a few suggestions for Twardowski to expand his reflection on concepts. Yet we cannot but regret what failed to happen. Could something more have come out of that meeting in the spring of 1904? Perhaps so, if we think of Twardowski's heartfelt letter of 2 December 1904, and Meinong's enthusiasm before that meeting (cf. Meinong to Twardowski, Graz, 14 May 1904, and an undated calling card from May 1904, in Meinong, Twardowski 2016, pp. 127–128) – though later he did not prove equally keen to keep up their relationship. That meeting had no sequel. But I like to imagine that they once played together, just as their philosophies on several points are in tune with each other.

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V e n a n z i o   R a s p a

**Meinong and Twardowski on Representations and Judgements**

**Keywords:** *content, intuition, judgements, A. Meinong, object, representations, K. Twardowski*

This paper discusses the intellectual relationship between Meinong and Twardowski, focusing on their ideas about representations and judgements, which are in part extraneous to Franz Brentano's philosophy. The two philosophers addressed similar topics and their respective positions can be seen to overlap in some regards. This is shown by looking at their views on judgements about relations, intuitive and non-intuitive representations, and Twardowski's represented judgements, which display some strong analogies with Meinong's assumptions.

