

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON POPE GREGORY XVI'S  
CONDEMNATION OF CLERICAL INVOLVEMENT  
IN THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTIONS:  
BUILDING THE CASE FOR REASSESSMENT

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**Abstract.** The reasons for the papal condemnation of Polish clerics active in the November Uprising of 1830/1 are various, and often depend on the source materials selected, as well as the time in which it was written. Invariably, historians have searched for outside influences bearing down on Pope Gregory XVI to bring about a decision; these include Austria, Russia, papal advisors, the swirling political times, and papal predecessors with their well-trodden policies. For all of the research devoted to this subject, there still exist a few critical, untapped areas. Gregory's foreign policy, to the extent he had one, and his view of Russia are unreflected in the narrative. This is because no one has seriously looked at his experiences in the Roman Curia prior to 1831, which include much on Russia. As well, the archives in Moscow dealing with Russian foreign affairs have never properly been exploited, and thus our understanding of tsarist thought is still out of focus. Assumptions in the historiography also need to be tested: were tsarist anti-Catholic attitudes or policy really so evident in the early 1830s when *Cum Primum* was issued? And can more be gleened from the circumstances surrounding the Brief of 15 February 1831 in understanding *Cum Primum*.

**Key words:** Gregory XVI, November Uprising, *Cum Primum*, Nicholas I, Prince Gagarin, Lambruschini, Bernetti, Mieczysław Żywczyński

When Pope Gregory XVI sided with Tsar Nicholas I in publicly reprimanding Polish bishops active in the Uprising of November 1830 with his issuance of *Cum Primum* in June 1832, the news attracted little attention. Limitations of the press, distrust of Russia and its presumed artifice, and the tardiness of the encyclical well after the uprising was quashed, accounted for the muted reaction (excluding of course those senior clerics directly affected by the papal encyclical)<sup>1</sup>. However, such an odd coalition has piqued the interest of a number of inquisitive historians over the last 180 years. What could have possibly induced Gregory to align himself with a notorious anti-Catholic Tsar? It is the task of this present work to discuss the views of those writers who have posited a meaning-

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<sup>1</sup> J. Słowacki's *Kordian* (1834) would soon get the message out.

ful opinion on the subject. This work acts as a continuation of the very elucidating historiographies of Mieczysław Żywczyński, who in the 1930s penned two of particular importance for this present study<sup>2</sup>. In the opening chapter of his magnus opus, *Geneza i Następstwa Encyklika Cum Primum*, Żywczyński assesses all related works up to 1935<sup>3</sup>.

This essay will bring the historiographical discussion up to date with a look at the progress made in the last seventy-five years. In adopting a schematic approach to the subject, as opposed to Żywczyński's chronological one, this work will confine itself to the narrow parameters of reasons for Gregory's Brief of 15 February 1831 (*Impensas Charitas*) and *Cum Primum* (1832). Following this, space will be devoted to problems or gaps still present in the field. In addition, there will be a short critique of Żywczyński's *Geneza*, given the central role it plays in the historiography. While some of his conclusions will be criticised, *Geneza* remains the standard in the field for the sheer amount of information compiled and the thoroughness on which he dealt with this topic.

While most historians generally ascribe more than one factor to Gregory's admonition to clerics in the Kingdom of Poland in 1832, most generally fix themselves around one major hypothesis, of which there are half a dozen or so. One of the most popular early theories claimed that Gregory had been misled by Russia; it had intentionally supplied him with misinformation about clerical involvement in the uprising, which induced him to issue both documents (*Impensas Charitas* and *Cum Primum*). This idea had its greatest currency in *Le Saint-Siège et la Russie* (1922) by the French Jesuit scholar Adrien Boudou. A work designed to vindicate papal actions, *Le Saint-Siège* claims that Russian envoy to Rome, Prince Gagarin, deliberately fabricated information about Polish clerical political involvement, in order to induce the Pope to respond<sup>4</sup>. Attempting to show Gregory's great concern for the Polish Church, Boudou uses, among other things, the supposed sympathetic reception of Polish emissary Sebastian Badeni in his diplomatic mission to Rome. Boudou's main argument, as well as his uncritical portrayal of the papacy, has been thoroughly refuted and dismissed as propaganda. Critical in overturning this view early on was Żywczyński<sup>5</sup>; clerics, and in particular, bishops, were not only supporting the war morally with

<sup>2</sup> M. Żywczyński, *Watykan i spawa polska w latach 1831–1836*, Warszawa 1934, 191ff, does cover some of the same ground as *Geneza i następstwa encykliki Cum Primum z 9 VI 1832 r.*, Warszawa 1935, ch. I, though with a different purpose.

<sup>3</sup> There also exists a short, but scholarly historiography in *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento* by Giampiero Bozzolato, 'Un momento della politica estera del conservatori polacchi verso il Vaticano', n. 51 (1964), 328–38.

<sup>4</sup> Boudou, *Le Saint-Siège et la Russie* (1922), i. 178ff.; cf. L. Lescoeur, *L'Église Catholique et le Gouvernement Russ*, Paris 1903, 106–107.

<sup>5</sup> M. Żywczyński, *Watykan i spawa polska*, 197–198, and *Geneza*, ch. XII.

their blessings and prayers, but were also assisting in tangible ways. A few, including the oft-cited Bishop Skórkowski, even offered financial assistance<sup>6</sup>.

There was another way in which historians, such as Boudou, have tried to show deception on the part of Russia. They claim that there was an implicit understanding by Gregory and his aides that conditions in Russia would improve for the Church with this show of anti-revolutionary solidarity by the Pope. This was made clear for Louis Lescoeur, who drew on General Zamoyski's correspondence. In meetings with the pontiff, the general reported that Gregory felt deceived by the course of events in Poland and exuded great remorse over his actions which appeared to have caused so much harm<sup>7</sup>. The flip side of this same coin, often argued by historians, was that Russia, instead of promising better ecclesiastical relations, had actually intimidated the Pope into a decision; so that lack of cooperation would result in much harm for the Church<sup>8</sup>. Many point to Gagarin's assistance in the drafting of *Cum Primum* as proof of this coercive state of affairs<sup>9</sup>. Lamennais developed the theory even further, believing that Russian military support of the Papal States, percolating at the time with political instability, would be withheld should Gregory fail to cooperate. And that it was this fact from which the pressure derived.

To be sure, political upheaval in the Papal States was cause for concern to Gregory and the Church. Daily reports of political agitators throughout the papal kingdom were received in the days and months following his election. The voluminous cache of legal proceedings housed in the State Archives of Rome against individuals apprehended by authorities testifies to the severity and ubiquity of the problem<sup>10</sup>. More broadly, the political situation in Europe at the time swayed the French historian Jean Leflon to conclude that Gregory empathised with the Tsar's plight<sup>11</sup>.

The most attractive theory in the historiography is the decisive role of Austria. Those who have tapped the Austrian archives have invariably come away

<sup>6</sup> There is a full body of literature on clerical involvement in the uprising; recently, E. Niebelski, *Patriotyczne listy biskupa Karola Skórkowskiego z czasów powstania 1830–1831 roku*, Annales UMCS, sec. Historia, vol. LX, Lublin, 2005, 43–53.

<sup>7</sup> L. Lescoeur, *L'Église Catholique en Pologne sous le Gouvernement Russe* (Paris 1860), 54ff, and Jean Leflon, *La crise révolutionnaire, 1789–1846*, Paris 1949, 457–60, versus Boudou, *Le Saint-Siège et la Russie*, i. 187–188.

<sup>8</sup> For example, B. Pawłowski, *Grzegorz XVI a Polska po powstaniu listopadowem* (1911), 503; Alan Reinerman, *Metternich, Pope Gregory XVI, and Revolutionary Poland, 1831–1842*, The Catholic Historical Review, vol. 86, n. 4, 603–619, 607–608.

<sup>9</sup> F. Lamennais, *Affaires de Rome*, Brussels 1836, 122–38; compare with Pawłowski, *Grzegorz XVI a Polska*, 504, who claims Gagarin was not involved, only Lambruschini and that the theological character of the encyclical bore this out; Boudou, *Le Saint-Siège et la Russie*, i. 186–187; also M. Żywiecki, *Watykan i sprawa polska*, 198, who took a middle position and probably the most accurate one: Gregory scrutinized every word but took into account the Tsar's wishes.

<sup>10</sup> ASR. *Carte di Miscellanea Politiche e Riservate*, 1830–1833.

<sup>11</sup> Leflon, *La crise révolutionnaire*, 456–457.

with the belief that Austria was integral to the whole process. They were the crucial mediator between St Petersburg and Rome in the spring of 1832, which resulted in *Cum Primum*. Bronisław Pawłowski emphasises Austria's own interests in achieving *detente* given its common political concerns, and its vulnerable territorial positioning with two of its dominions bordering areas of political instability, in the Polish Kingdom and the Papal States<sup>12</sup>. He also believed that Gregory was trusting of Austria as his negotiator, being rather disinterested himself in direct involvement. What is more, Austria's standing army in the belly of the Papal States beginning in April 1831 not only ensured political stability, it also signalled a privileged position of influence in politico-religious matters. This was an important consideration for Alan Reinerman, who posits that Austria had convinced Gregory that the Church would be better off if he issued the encyclical and that this would result in improved conditions for his Polish flock<sup>13</sup>.

As well, two papal advisors have often been mentioned as directing Gregory's foreign policy. Secretaries of State Bernetti (1831–1836) and Lambruschini (1836–1846) are written about in such terms. For men like Reinerman and Maciej Loret, Bernetti's expertise in foreign affairs compensated for his boss's disinterest.<sup>14</sup> Bernetti had cut his political teeth earlier as special envoy to St Petersburg in 1826 and later as secretary of state during the final seven months of Leo XII's pontificate. His understanding of Russian affairs and friendship with Gagarin, it was thought, were important in reaching an agreement.

Żywczyński underscores the efforts of Lambruschini, Gregory's close friend and fellow monk, in the development of *Cum Primum*. It was this future secretary of state who played the major role in redacting the neglected Brief of February 1831 into a papal censure acceptable to all parties<sup>15</sup>. Żywczyński builds the case for Lambruschini based on his key involvement in the concurrent Lamennais affair<sup>16</sup>. However for Żywczyński, Lambruschini was the instrument through which a more salient motive is evinced.

Żywczyński believed that Gregory followed a pre-set church policy in condemning clerical participation in the Polish Uprising<sup>17</sup>. Political instigating by

<sup>12</sup> Pawłowski, *Grzegorz XVI a Polska*, 501–503, and what follows in the paragraph.

<sup>13</sup> Reinerman, 'Metternich, Pope Gregory XVI, and Revolutionary Poland', 608.

<sup>14</sup> M. Loret, *Watykan a Polska (1815–1832)*, „Biblioteka Warszawska”, vol. II, 1913, 231. Loret's other contributions include elucidating a Roman view of the Uprising; and discussing the Congress of Poland period in the run up to the November Uprising.

<sup>15</sup> M. Żywczyński, *Geneza*, 55ff.

<sup>16</sup> E. Winter would expand on this comparison, feeling that the Church's opinion of Lamennais foreshadowed its feelings towards the Polish Revolution. (*Russland und Das Papsttum: Von der Aufklärung bis zur Grossen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution*, 2 vols., Berlin 1960–1961, ii. 222).

<sup>17</sup> M. Żywczyński, *Geneza*, chapter II.

clerics in opposition to existing governments would not be tolerated. Pius VII's, and later Leo XII's, injunction against subversive activities, especially on the part of clerics, such as those in Spanish America, were important and immediate precedents for Gregory. His papal brief, therefore, was not an anomaly; rather, it followed a standard papal policy in place at least since the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

Żywczyński's *Geneza* is the most important work in the field, even acknowledged by some as the final authority on the subject. Given this fact, it is appropriate to mention a word or two about it, especially since there has never been, to my knowledge, a Western review of the book. Without a doubt, its strength is in the details and the amount of information amassed, accurately exploiting all source materials available at that time. Highly scholarly, Żywczynski not only explicates the main arguments and points of contention, but also lays plain the minutiae of the proceedings.

If we overlook the very sticky issue of ecclesiastical counter revolutionary activities (for example, the *Sanfedistas* in southern Italy led by Cardinal Ruffo), there is indeed a discernible general policy that can be deduced from this somewhat narrow period outlined by Żywczynski. However, a fixed theory belies the uncertainties surrounding papal decisions, at least in the case of Pope Leo XII and the Spanish American dilemma<sup>18</sup>. There was no unanimity on the exact policy to adopt towards Spain and the breakaway American republics in the late 1820s. During face-to-face discussions between Madrid and Rome, Cardinal Cappellari, the future Pope Gregory XVI, argued for a more even-handed treatment of both Spain and the fledgling republics; this position was eventually overturned when the Spanish diplomat, Labrador, frustratingly abandoned these talks, and appealed directly to Leo, who recapitulated, returning to a pro-Spanish position in order to appease King Ferdinand VII. Such discord belies the notion of any fixed papal policy. What is more, senior clerics simply did not speak in such terms. There is no mention of such an overt papal agenda in Vatican documents in the period running up to *Cum Primum*.

This leads us to a more general criticism related to the overall argument of *Geneza*. It offers many lucid insights about this affair; so many, in fact, that they fail to unite into a cohesive argument. The political pressure which Żywczynski sees bearing down on Gregory from both Russia and Austria is never satisfactorily harmonized with his larger point of a preformed papal policy<sup>19</sup>. Would the papacy really have felt such pressure, given its supposedly clear position on the matter? And the effective rehabilitation of Lamennais as a credible source in assessing Russia's strong position, using its military support as a bargaining tool, is left uneasily next to the notion that Austria was predominant in the affair.

<sup>18</sup> See Vatican Secret Archives, Congregation of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, the Americas, 1825–1830.

<sup>19</sup> Summarised on page 168, M. Żywczynski, *Geneza*.

None of these very interesting ideas are woven together into a larger, unified theme.

In much of this, Źywczyński can hardly be faulted, for he never had access to the all-important Vatican documents. And he himself is the first to admit that this gap exists. Despite these unfavourable circumstances, Źywczyński's contribution represents the largest contribution in the field. He highlights all of the important points in the historiography up to 1935, and corrects a few important ones. No longer is there confusion or disagreement on whether or not Polish clerics participated in the revolution. And Lamennais, thanks to *Geneza*, is resurrected as a credible witness to the events contemporary to him, after having been much maligned<sup>20</sup>. He also draws upon the concurrent Lamennais affair in contextualising *Cum Primum* and Lambruschini's role in it. He provides the first exhaustive account of the Brief of 15 February 1831, drawing attention to the papal errors in the document<sup>21</sup>. These and other lesser points have brought much alignment to a formerly wayward storyline. And his attention to detail and overall scholarship of *Geneza* is a benchmark for any would-be historian. However, the work is most profitably consulted as a reference rather than a book read front to back.

What gaps or problems still exist in the historiography? The great irony when discussing this subject is that the two main protagonists, Pope Gregory XVI and Tsar Nicholas I, are largely absent from the narrative. Instead, the storyline is pieced together from third-party sources or circumstantial evidence, such as the revolutionary climate in the Papal States which surely induced the Pope to act. But there is nothing that can be claimed as direct, first-hand evidence about the thoughts or motives of either person. In the case of Russia, the matter is more straightforward. There are untapped archival documents in Moscow awaiting perusal by a would-be researcher. The only work seriously attempting to understand the Russian perspective in this affair is Eduard Winter, who utilizes Russian printed sources as well as Prussian documents<sup>22</sup>. The overall result is a less critical portrayal of Russia. Winter contends that feelings towards Lamennais foreshadowed the Church's attitude towards the Polish Uprising; he also believed that Russia, Austria and the Church worked together, with Metternich acting as the fulcrum.

In Gregory's case, a lack of firsthand information has forced historians to understand the Church's decision as a collaborative one; specifically that he relied on papal advisors such as Bernetti or Lambruschini, or was influenced by Austria or Russia. There is simply a lack of knowledge about Gregory, as Źywczyński himself points out: 'It is not a surprise that our work has to resign in advance from solving certain issues. ...We are able to talk about Vatican relations to the

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<sup>20</sup> M. Źywczyński, *Geneza*, *passim*.

<sup>21</sup> M. Źywczyński, *Geneza*, ch. IX.

<sup>22</sup> E. Winter, *Russland und das Papsttum*, ii. 220ff.

Polish condition but not about the Pope himself<sup>23</sup>. In many respects this problem outlined in 1935 is still present today. What is known has been transmitted to us largely from diplomatic reports. Thus, Gregory's 'silence' has been interpreted as either lack of interest or understanding, with most historical depictions characterising Gregory in the same detached manner<sup>24</sup>. Boudou is virtually alone in depicting a very active and engaged pontiff throughout these proceedings; but his jaundiced views have had the unfortunate consequence of shelving his otherwise important insights about Gregory<sup>25</sup>. No one has interpreted this silence as an indication that Gregory acted alone (especially in the case of *Impensas Charitas*), although Zywczyński and Zygmunt Zieliński provide some space for this with their notions of a fixed policy theory or untenable revolutionary activites (see below). And while there is little direct knowledge of Gregory's feelings on this matter after he becomes Pope, he had much to say about Russia prior to 1831: he was consultant for the Roman Curia in at least four Russian cases; and he cooperated with Russian diplomats, among others, over a two-year period in the late 1820s in securing stable conditions for his Church in the Ottoman empire, in his position as prefect of propaganda. The historiography, however, has thus far failed to take into account these curial experiences in reconstructing his view of ecclesiastical affairs in Russian lands<sup>26</sup>.

And despite Zywczyński's admittance that archival gaps exist, with the exception of Winter, the historiography has largely stagnated since *Geneza*. Zieliński wrote that *Geneza* was so comprehensive that no one has attempted to do more research in the field<sup>27</sup>. Yet he himself would articulate a meaningful, straightforward theory, a sort of hybrid of Zywczyński's main idea; that the Holy See could not support revolutionary ideas represented by Poles or any other nation, especially given their harmful effects on the Church in its recent past<sup>28</sup>. Gregory 'had an obligation' to condemn these clerical actions because of the times in which he lived. The Church, on the other hand, could accept as *fait accompli* the activities of those in Belgium, for example, because they had been victorious – the November Uprising had not.

Others have understood that there was work in the field that still needed to be done: in 1994 Andrzej Wroński observed that there had been no attempt to understand the politics of Gregory XVI, a seemingly critical element in fully grasp-

<sup>23</sup> M. Zywczyński, *Watykan i sprawa Polska*, 190.

<sup>24</sup> M. Zywczyński, *Geneza*, 44–45, though at other times he describes an active Pope; cf. Loret, 'Watykan a Polska', 232ff. Newer Polish histories fall in line with this view: for example, J. Kłoczowski, *Kościół w świecie i w Polsce: szkice historyczne*, Katowice 1986.

<sup>25</sup> Boudou, , *Le Saint-Siège et la Russie*, 172 and 186.

<sup>26</sup> Begin with the very valuable study of A. Barańska, *Miedzy Warszawą, Petersburgiem i Rzymem*, Lublin 2008.

<sup>27</sup> Z. Zieliński, *Epoka rewolucji totalitaryzmów studia i szkice*, Lublin 1993, 42.

<sup>28</sup> Z. Zieliński, *Boski czy ludzki? Kościół w Polsce i na świecie, wczoraj i dziś*, Częstochowa 2002, pp. 63ff.

ing this event<sup>29</sup>. That is not to say that progress has not been made in neighbouring areas. For his part, Wroński analyzes the wording of both papal documents in developing new ideas. The insightful writings of Ewa Jabłońska-Deptuła have focused on the different mentalities between Rome and Warsaw: irreconcilable mindsets existed between the pontiff and his Slavic brethren<sup>30</sup>. Religious duty and nationalistic aspirations, so distinguishable for the Pope were, in her opinion, inextricably linked in the Polish clerical mind.

Another peculiarity of the historiography is the tendency to overlook the unsent Brief of 1831 altogether when forming an opinion about *Cum Primum*. Those who do look at both documents generally isolate each, rather than interpreting them as a progression<sup>31</sup>. More could be made of the differences between the two documents. The factors at play in 1832 and *Cum Primum* were very different from those at the beginning of Gregory's pontificate in 1831 and potentially provide clues into papal thinking. For example, Austria, Lambruschini – and even pro-Secretary of State Bernetti – were involved in 1832 in ways they never were in the preceding year. Lambruschini was not even in Rome in 1831. At the time Austria was unaware that the Brief of 15 February 1831 was sent. And Bernetti's position as secretary of state was in limbo for the first weeks of Gregory's pontificate, as the pontiff laboured over whether to appoint Bernetti permanently, or award the post to Cardinal Macchi, his personal favourite. The speed in which the first Brief was delivered – a week or so after Gagarin's request in early February 1831 – suggests that few people if any, outside of the Pope himself, were involved in the first Brief. Such decisiveness on the part of Gregory cannot be ruled out given his former curial experiences with Russia.

If we return to the original question posed at the outset of this piece (What could have possibly induced Gregory to align himself with a notorious anti-Catholic Tsar?), there is an implicit assumption that Gregory was aware of the blatant anti-Catholic agenda of Nicholas I. This assumption has served to sharpen the criticism towards Gregory following *Cum Primum*<sup>32</sup>. The Ukases of February 1826 and especially 22 April 1828 were large clues, for many, as to the trajectory of the Tsar's insidious anti-Catholic policies which culminated in martyrdoms, forced exiles, and violent suppressions by 1839<sup>33</sup>. And in hindsight this

<sup>29</sup> A. Wroński, *Duchowieństwo i Kościół katolicki w Królestwie Polskim wobec sprawy narodowej w latach 1832–1860*, Warszawa 1994, 59.

<sup>30</sup> E. Jabłońska-Deptuła, 'Le Romantisme Religieux Polonais et le Religiosité du Sentiment Patriotique', in *Les Contacts Religieux Franco-Polonais du Moyen Age à nos Jours*, Paris 1985, pp. 273–291, 277–278. However, Professor Anna Barańska points out that the union between the insurrectional movement and the Catholics in Poland was coerced by particular circumstances which were not wholly 'natural' at the time; these special circumstances call for more careful study.

<sup>31</sup> Wroński, *Duchowieństwo i Kościół katolicki*, 56ff.

<sup>32</sup> E. Duffy, *Saints & Sinners: A History of the Pope* (206), 282, calls it 'the great papal failure'. See also Bianchi, *Storia Documentata*, iii. 218ff. Pawłowski, *Grzegorz XVI a Polska*, 500 and 502.

<sup>33</sup> L. Lescoeur, *L'Église Catholique et le Gouvernement Russe*, Paris 1903, 62ff.

trend is quite visible; histories beginning as early as the mid 1830s lay plain the anti-Catholic Russian policy<sup>34</sup>. Lamennais, who also wrote during this period, reached his conclusions based on this very same understanding.

Yet there is compelling circumstantial evidence which suggests that in the early 1830s, the tsarist policy towards the Catholic Church – Latin or Uniate – was believed to be still fluid even benign, and not yet set on the inexorable path of destruction that was eventually taken. The romantic interests of his oldest brother, Alexander, in 1825 to unite his Orthodox Church with Rome was still relatively fresh on the minds of many including Gregory XVI himself who had initially been tapped to lead this covert exploratory mission<sup>35</sup>. Loret, who drew on Vatican sources, suggests this: ‘In the first years of Nicholas I’s reign, Rome was inclined to view [his Catholic policy] as a continuation of Alexander’s politics. This lasts more or less until the onset of the November Uprising’<sup>36</sup>. But there were other reasons to believe Gregory viewed Nicholas as a benevolent tsar even into the early years of his pontificate. The new statutes drawn up in early 1832 for the Polish Kingdom assured under Article IV religious toleration and uninhibited exercise of the Catholic faith; in addition Russia was also in agreement with Rome and Vienna about the harmful ideas of Lamennais and the need for censorship; these facts would have acted as a smokescreen to any clear antagonistic policy towards the Polish Church; most compellingly, Austria – that harbinger of diplomatic insight – was also convinced in 1832 during the discussions surrounding *Cum Primum* that more prosperous days lay ahead for the Church in Russian lands<sup>37</sup>. It was this point more than any other which consoled Gregory the second time around in deciding for *Cum Primum*. And there is no hint in the documentation that Austria was anything but sincere in this view. In the end they were wrong, but it was Gregory who bore the bitter consequences of this advice. And finally, the memorandum that accompanied *Cum Primum* and listed the papal grievances that Gregory hoped the Tsar would address carried with it the implicit notion that a favourable Russian policy was still a possibility.

In conclusion, the story of papal involvement in the Polish Uprising is one that has been minutely analyzed in many areas; yet still uncritically researched in an important few. Until documents in Moscow and Vatican City are examined with a proper understanding of the rich quarry of information already available, and with a steely determination to challenge certain entrenched assumptions or trends in the historiography, the verdict of *Cum Primum* will remain incomplete.

<sup>34</sup> For example, [Comte d’Horror], *Persécutions et souffrances de l’Église catholique en Russie*, 1842.

<sup>35</sup> Most recently, A. Barańska, *Czy car Aleksander I przyjął wiarę katolicką? Tajna misja generała Michaud de Beauretour do papieża Leona XII*, “Przegląd Wschodni”, n. 40, to be published in 2010, an excellent historiography and retelling of the story.

<sup>36</sup> Loret, *Watykan a Polska. (1815–1832)*, 228.

<sup>37</sup> Pawłowski, *Grzegorz XVI a Polska*, 501.

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ROZWAŻANIA HISTORIOGRAFICZNE NA TEMAT POTĘPIENIA PRZEZ PAPIEŻA  
GRZEGORZA XVI ZAANGAŻOWANIA DUCHOWIEŃSTWA W POWSTANIU  
LISTOPADOWYM: PRZYCZYNEK DO POWTÓRNEJ OCENY

**Streszczenie.** Powody papieskiego potępienia działalności duchowieństwa w powstaniu listopadowym 1830–1831 są różnorakie i często zależą od materiałów źródłowych oraz okresu, kiedy zostały one napisane. Historycy szukali czynników zewnętrznych mających wpływ na decyzję papieża Grzegorza XVI; dotyczyły one Austrii, Rosji, doradców papieskich, burzliwego okresu politycznego, a także poprzedników papieskich z ich dobrze wydeptanymi ścieżkami politycznymi. Pomimo wielu badań poświęconych temu tematowi, istnieje nadal kilka istotnych niezbadań obszarów. Polityka zagraniczna Grzegorza XVI – w takim zakresie, w jakim ją uprawiał – oraz jego poglądy na Rosję nie są odzwierciedlane w historii. Dzieje się tak, ponieważ nikt nie patrzył poważnie na jego doświadczenia w Kurii Rzymskiej przed rokiem 1831, które w dużej mierze dotyczyły Rosji. Ponadto, moskiewskie archiwum dotyczące rosyjskich spraw zagranicznych nigdy nie zostały właściwie zbadane, więc nasze zrozumienie myśli carskiej wciąż jest niejasne. Założenia w historiografii także należy badać, czy carska antykatolicka postawa lub polityka naprawdę była tak oczywista we wczesnych latach 30. XIX w., kiedy wydano *Cum Primum*? I czy można wyjaśnić więcej na podstawie okoliczności dotyczących Upomnienia z 15 lutego 1831 r. w rozumieniu *Cum Primum*?

**Slowa kluczowe:** Grzegorz XVI, powstanie listopadowe, Mikołaj I, Księże Gagarin, Lambruschi ni, Bernetti, Mieczysław Żywczyński