TY - JOUR N2 - The aim of this article is a critical analysis of Peter F. Strawson’s theory of primitiveness of the concept of person contained in the third chapter of the Individuals. The problems associated with the distinction between M-predicates and P-predicates are pointed out. The article shows different ways of understanding primitiveness of the concept of person, and points to gaps in Strawson’s argumentation and to the dubious potential of the theory if it is used to solve some basic problems in philosophy of mind. It also deals with some of the difficulties outlined, but does not propose to solve them all. L1 - http://czasopisma.pan.pl/Content/114352/PDF/P.Filoz.%204-19%2018-A.Stepnik.pdf L2 - http://czasopisma.pan.pl/Content/114352 PY - 2019 IS - No 4 EP - 316 DO - 10.24425/pfns.2019.130930 KW - P.F. Strawson KW - person KW - concept of person KW - primitiveness of the concept of person A1 - Stępnik, Andrzej PB - Komitet Nauk Filozoficznych PAN PB - Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego DA - 2020.01.13 T1 - The primitiveness of the concept of person in the philosophy of P.F. Strawson: A critical analysis SP - 299 UR - http://czasopisma.pan.pl/dlibra/publication/edition/114352 T2 - Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria ER -