Autor definiuje pojęcie kultury przez odniesienie do szczególnej kategorii znaczeń normatywnych, czyli wartości. System wartości zorganizowany jest wokół trzech wartości najbardziej ogólnych i fundamentalnych: prawdy, dobra i piękna. Odpowiednio mówić można o trzech domenach kultury: kulturze poznawczej, kulturze moralnej i kulturze estetycznej. Desygnatami kultury poznawczej są przekonania, poglądy, opinie podzielane przez członków społeczeństwa. Desygnatami kultury moralnej są relacje łączące jednostki w przestrzeni międzyludzkiej. Desygnatami kultury estetycznej są szczególnego typu wytwory należące do sztuki artystycznej lub użytkowej. Podobieństwo wartości w każdym z tych trzech obszarów stanowi silny czynnik wytwarzający więzi społeczne i wspólnoty, a także tożsamości społeczne. Kultura jest fundamentem żywej i bogatej tkanki społecznej, społeczeństwa obywatelskiego.
In the paper I show why we should consider Stoicism as the historical source of St. Thomas’s distinction between ‘conscience’ and ‘synderesis’. I claim that the Stoic terms syntērēsis and syneidēsis became, through the ages, the Thomistic synderesis and conscientia. The Stoic syntērēsis meant ‘self-preservation’, and in all animals this ‘first instinct’ refers to the body. The man is the only creature, which, because of its ‘rational nature’, preserves not necessarily its body but rather its soul, i.e. a system of values. Such preservation of someone’s axiological integrity equals ‘salvation’, and thus assimilates Stoicism to Christianity. In the Stoic system, human values follow ‘the nature’ (or ‘the human nature’ in particular), and in Thomism, they follow ‘synderesis’, or the natural inclination toward the good. In both cases we find a natural instinct that transforms itself into a rational structure of conscience. I also argue that, thanks to the moral phenomena of ‘adaptation’ (oikeiōsis) and ‘advancement’ (teleiōsis), the Stoic ethics is not completely egocentric, but incorporates also social duties.
The aim of the article is to compare the thought collective and the interpretive community, two surprisingly similar notions formulated independently by Ludwik Fleck and Stanley Fish. In contemporary discourse, both concepts are used as synonims, while an accurate analysis of the contexts of the use of interesting terms proves that the equivalent of the interpretive community is rather thought collective, as well as the thought style, both of these concepts in the deliberations of Fish are subject to contamination. The exact repartition of the notion of interpretive community seems to be important due to the frequency of its use in works in the field of literary interpretation and cognition. The article also presents more general remarks on the functioning and possible origin of twin terms and their role in scientific cognition.
Roger Scruton refers to Thomas Stearns Eliot in almost every one of his books, but despite the undoubtedly fundamental influence, which Eliot had exerted on the development of Scruton’s outlook, apart from a short article entitled Eliot and Conservatism, Scruton did not devote a separate work to Eliot’s thought. As I try to show this is due to the fact that Scruton was not so much a scholar of Eliot, as a continuator of his thought – not merely an expert on his philosophy and poetry, but an inheritor of his spiritual legacy. Both Eliot and Scruton belong to a current, which may rightly be called conservative philosophy of culture. In this paper I outline the conception of culture advanced by Eliot, and show how Scruton draws on this conception in his own spiritual development.
The Christian laity is called to the ministry of evangelization in the Church and for the Church. In this work, basic ecclesial communities play an important role, because they are forming disciples of Christ and preparing them to bear testimony to the Gos-pel in the world. The communities have been initiated in the Church of South America and are centres of evangelization as a true expression of ecclesial communion (ChL no. 26). They also express the preferential option of the Church for the poor, because they are often created by people deprived of fair access to material goods and live on the margins of society. In the activities of basic ecclesial communities, the poor evan-gelize themselves first, feeding on the Word of God, to make it a source of inspiration for life and action. At that time, the poor are becoming subjects of evangelization, when they recognize the proclamation of the Good News of salvation as their task, not only with words but also through the testimony of life. The transmission of the Gospel occurs in interpersonal encounters in which the attitude of believers in Christ urges people to adopt Christian values and imbue in them the culture created by them.
The article presents the phenomenon of increasing sharing in-formations for free on the Internet and the contemporary development of gift economy in the form of a movement most often called cybercommunism. The article points out two basic attitudes in treating information. According to the first one, information should be treated as a commodity to which property rights can be attributed and which is subject to market play. This involves such issues as copyright, fees, licenses and other ways of protecting the interests of market players. The second attitude is to treat valuable information as a common good, often with a moral imperative to share it (to varying degrees Open Source and Open Acces, the idea of copyleft, DIY, P2P network, YouTube, The Pirate Bay domain etc.). Since every concept or movement proclaiming a community of goods is called communism (in a broader sense of the word, in a narrower sense it is a specific political system, e.g. the Soviet Union), today we are dealing with digital communism on the Internet. Some researchers (Firer-Blaess, Fuchs) point to Wikipedia as an example. The Internet encyclopedia operates on the basis of principles that go beyond the capitalist way of production and represent an informational-communist way of production: in the subjective dimension, it is a cooperative work and in the objective dimension, a shared ownership of the means of production. The text also presents the division of ethics into an abstract and concrete one, applied to the behaviour of network users. If someone within the framework of an abstract ethics preaches the principle of “You will not pirate.” (copying and distributing illegally) is a corresponding principle of specific ethics that says “You will not pirate unless O1 or O2...or he.” In practice, concrete ethics push many Internet users to treat Internet resources as a common good, from which everyone can draw according to their own needs. Digital communism can be treated, on the one hand, as a partially implemented idea and, on the other, as a postulate. From an axiological point of view, this postulate would be connected with the Internet implementation of equality (access to resources for everyone) and freedom (access to all information).
The author champions the belief that Karl Marx offered a theory of capitalism, and not a theory of socialism. This explains, she argues, why we cannot find a detailed and well-constructed conception of human society that will exist in the future. Marx continued, however, to draw prognostic conclusions from his diagnosis of the capitalist status quo, and his numerous manuscripts are replete with social predictions. They were different at different times, and as the capitalist system tended to change in his lifetime, so changed Marx’s expectations about the future course of events. One thing remained unchanged, however. He always proclaimed the coming of a classless community based on the principle that a free development of each is a necessary prerequisite of a free development of all.
The paper discusses political philosophy of Bogusław Wolniewicz. The leading idea of his general philosophy was rationalism of a specific type that he called ‘tychistic’ (meaning ‘based on fate’), or ‘transcendental’ (meaning ‘transgressing the limits of nature by reliance on human reason’). This self-description presents Wolniewicz as an author respecting his Christian background, though personally he did not espouse the complete body of precepts postulated by the Church. As a nonconfessional catholic he spoke in favor of Christian civilization which he identified with Western culture. This led him to the reject of liberalism, libertarianism and leftist ideologies. He wanted to be perceived as a democrat who supported civil and republican democracy based on the virtue of patriotism. He emphasized the essentiality of the possession of its own political state by each independent nation, and the most important circle of loyalty was for him a national community. Thus he undertook to defend a conception of cautious xenophobia that was expurgated of hate but dedicated to the defense of a national territory.
The concept of conscience is analyzed here in two different ways: the systematic and the historical-literary. As to the first, systematic perspective, I distinguish (in part 1) three levels of conscience and on every level I identify two opposite categories (conscience that is ‛individual’ versus ‛collective’; ‛emotional’ versus ‛intellectual’; ‛motivating ex ante’ versus ‛evaluating ex post’). In the second, historical-literary perspective, I analyze two literary cases of fictional characters usually thought of as being guided or affected by conscience. The first case is the ancient Greek tragedy and here I offer (in part 2) a comment on the Sophoclean Antigone and the Euripidean Orestes presenting them both as dramas that contain an exemplary formulation of the phenomenon of conscience. Although Antigone and Orestes express their main principles of action in apparently different words, I suggest (in part 3) the two poetical visions of conscience are equally based upon a highly emotional behavior called pathos by the Greek. Thereby I provide a reason, why ancient philosophers created a new concept of conscience intended as an alternative to the poetical vision of human behavior. The new philosophical concept of conscience was based upon an axiological behavior called ethos. I also coin (in part 4) a concept of the ‛community of conscience’ where I distinguish four ‛aspects of solidarity’ in conscience, namely, somebody’s own self, a group of significant persons, a group of the same moral principles, and a sameness of life. In the end I turn (in part 5) to a historical-literary case in Joseph Conrad’s last novel The Rover (1923), which provoked a lively discussion among Polish authors and seems useful as an illustration of several levels of ‛solidarity of conscience’.
The purpose of the paper is to examine the discursive strategies of persuasion exploring the rhetorical
argument from community combined with linguistic politeness. Based on eighty reviews of two French
comedies, the author shows how the persuasive strategies reflect some methods used in advertising
discourse, especially with regard to the rhetoric principle of movere and delectare and indirect means
of interpretation, activated in discourse by the use of quantity and quality.