Abstract
Considering responsibility as a key anthropological category, Roman Ingarden stresses that it could only be inquired through the lens of a subject that is perceived personally, and not as a ‘pure I’. On the one hand, responsibility determines the nature of personal existence, and on the other hand, personal existence constitutes a space for interrogating about any meanings of the concept of responsibility. What remains problematic, however, is an alternative outlined by Ingarden, which implies that perception of a personal subject must be conducted within either of two perspectives – one that refers to a substantial model of personal subject, or the other that relates to acts of actualising the subject, which unfold in the stream of consciousness. It seems possible to go beyond this contradiction and reconcile the two perspectives – which the modern philosophy of dialogue proposes to do. Ingarden emphasises that the analysis of the concept of responsibility should not be limited to the realm of morality. However, all four scenarios that the philosopher uses as research fields to scrutinise the concept point, or at least imply the necessity of including aesthetic issues. Furthermore, the four fields of analysis – when somebody 1) bears responsibility, 2) takes responsibility, 3) is held responsible, and 4) acts responsibly – should not be perceived as isolated from one another. The link between them is man, who appears as a person in certain situations, while in others, his personal status is unrevealed, although it still remains within a firm horizon of situations and meanings examined herein. Moreover, regardless of the polarisation of the research fields highlighted by Ingarden, moral context constitutes a permanent space of reference for a human person, who not only asks for the sense (meanings) of responsibility, but also determines his/her personal existence through meanings and with their help.
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